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INTRODUCTION
$4.7 million. That number represents the combined contributions Uber
and Lyft made to lobbying efforts in 2020.1 Compare this to the $12.50 Ben
Valdez, a California-based Uber driver, who drives for the company 12 to
15 hours a day, three days per week, receives per hour.2 In today’s economy,
which the “gig economy” occupies a growing share, greater competition
means more pressure on companies to lower prices. From the worker’s
perspective, lower prices translate into lower wages and fewer employee
benefits.3
Because of how labor and employment laws have developed in the United
States, employers are responsible for extending and paying for many
essential benefits, such as health insurance, disability insurance,
unemployment insurance, and more.4 A problem lies in the fact that workers,
1. See Victor Reklaitis, Uber and Lyft Set Records in Annual Spending on Washington
Lobbying, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 22, 2021, 4:21 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
uber-and-lyft-set-records-in-annual-spending-on-washington-lobbying-11611350508
[https://perma.cc/3M2L-HYHS].
2. See Michael Sainato, ‘I Can’t Keep Doing This’: Gig Workers Say Pay Has Fallen
After California’s Prop 22, GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguard
ian.com/us-news/2021/feb/18/uber-lyft-doordash-prop-22-drivers-california [https://perma
.cc/PH23-PHPP]. On good days, Valdez makes $100 for eight hours of work, amounting to
$12.50 per hour, less than California’s $14 hourly minimum wage — not accounting for fuel
and other expenses like vehicle repairs. See id. The article does not specify whether this
compensation includes money earned from tips, but, in any event, the difference is likely
negligible since the vast majority of Uber customers do not tip their drivers. See Andrew J.
Hawkins, Nearly Two-Thirds of Uber Customers Don’t Tip Their Drivers, Study Says, VERGE
(Oct. 21, 2019, 3:32 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/21/20925109/uber-tippingriders-drivers-percentage-gender-nber-study [https://perma.cc/5BJZ-YL3G]; see also Ken
Jacobs & Michael Reich, The Uber/Lyft Ballot Initiative Guarantees Only $5.64 an Hour,
U.C. BERKELEY LAB. CTR. (Oct. 31, 2019), https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/the-uber-lyftballot-initiative-guarantees-only-5-64-an-hour-2/ [https://perma.cc/F8NN-2EC4].
3. See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO
MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 14–15 (2014).
4. See Brian A. Brown II, Note, Your Uber Driver Is Here, but Their Benefits Are Not:
The ABC Test, Assembly Bill 5, and Regulating Gig Economy Employers, 15 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 183, 186 (2020); see also My Employer Says I Am an Independent Contractor.
What Does This Mean?, COMMC’N WORKERS AM., https://cwa-union.org/about/rights-on-job/
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like Mr. Valdez, who provide services via platform companies,5 are largely
not legally classified as employees, rendering them without legal protections
and benefits associated with “traditional” employment.6 As this Note
explains, in addition to lacking assurance of making federal statutory
minimum wage along with other basic rights, Valdez and others, who work
for platform companies, such as Uber, must take on the financial and tax
responsibilities of independent business entities, while not reaping the
benefits and, at the same time, often remaining financially dependent on the
platform. Change is seemingly approaching as the Department of Labor, the
Internal Revenue Service, and other stakeholders discover and increase
enforcement mechanisms against the improper classification of workers as
independent contractors. At the same time, in part due to lack of regulation,
and intense lobbying efforts, the law in its current state continues to
accommodate platform companies’ business model, putting little pressure on
them to provide workers with bare minimum rights, such as a livable wage.
One problem long-facing employers, workers, legislatures, and courts is
that of defining the contours of the employment relationship, especially in
relation to whether a worker is an independent contractor or an employee.
The independent contractor, in contrast to a traditional employee, brings to

legal-toolkit/my-employer-says-i-am-independent-contractor-what-does-mean
[https://perma.cc/864H-FT4Q] (last visited Feb. 23, 2022).
5. Platform company is used throughout this Note to describe online intermediaries that
hire service providers to provide customers with short-term access to services. Examples
include both unskilled “physical” services, such as transportation and delivery providers, and
“crowdwork,” which can involve skilled work, such as “writing software code.” See Arne L.
Kalleberg & Michael Dunn, Good Jobs, Bad Jobs in the Gig Economy, 20 PERSPS. ON WORK
10, 11–12 (2016). The working relationship between the intermediary and the worker varies
depending on the service the platform provides. Further, the needs of workers in each segment
of the workforce vary — for example, a Handy worker performing carpentry and home repairs
may be at risk of hurting their back while working, while such injury poses less of a risk for
the data analyst sitting at a desk from home (although perhaps a non-ergonomic chair can
pose its own risk). This Note focuses on platforms with physical presence due to their closer
approximation to the physical world of employers and employees. While there are distinct
issues for crowdsourced work that can involve multiple jurisdictions — and countries — the
issue of exploitation and protection dealt with here also have application in the crowdsource
universe.
6. Only “employers” in the legal sense are required to provide worker’s compensation,
see, e.g., N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 202 (McKinney 2021), unemployment insurance, see,
e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 560 (McKinney 2021), and those of a certain size are required to pay
for employee health insurance. See Affordable Care Act Tax Provisions for Employers,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Nov. 23, 2021), https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/emp
loyers [https://perma.cc/93QN-GT7W]. In addition, federal antidiscrimination law applies
only to employees and applicants for employee positions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see
also Adcock v. Chrysler Corp., 166 F.3d 1290, 1292 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]here must be some
connection with an employment relationship for Title VII protections to apply.” (quoting
Lutcher v. Musicians Union Loc. 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir.1980))).
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mind an individual engaged in business for herself.7 The independent
contractor is rightly understood to contract with the hiring entity to complete
a specific project that is outside the core business realm of the other party.8
For example, a construction worker contracts with a homebuilder to perform
carpentry for a new building. The homebuilder specifies the job and the
timeframe in which he wants the work completed, and the two parties agree
on the level of compensation for the finished project. This scenario also
involves an aspect of skill; a giant real estate development might require the
work of many independent contractors, some specializing in carpentry,
electric, or plastering, to complete the project.9 These contractors may work
on many projects simultaneously.10
In reality, distinguishing an independent contractor from an employee has
become quite complex and made more so by the corporate trend to outsource,
subcontract, and franchise work.11 In many cases, courts struggle to apply
judicially created tests, which rely on a number of nebulous concepts. Some
of these considerations include to what extent the hiring entity exercises
control over the worker, whether the worker has the opportunity for profit
and loss, and whether the worker is engaged in an independent trade of the
same nature as the service he provides. The existence of such different tests,
and even different versions of such tests, across jurisdictions and statutes is
an issue that has sparked extensive debate in the legal community. 12
Misclassification — where employers, often purposely, wrongly classify
their workers as independent contractors — harms workers who must
consequently foot the bill for injuries suffered on the job or else must resort
to costly and time-consuming tort actions to recover damages.13 This

7. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 33 (Cal. 2018)
(describing a “traditional contractor” as one “working only in his or her own independent
business” and providing the “independent plumber or electrician” as an example).
8. See WEIL, supra note 3, at 120.
9. See Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 33 (discussing the original conception of independent
contractor as an individual who performs work that the hiring entity cannot “execute for
themselves” and as one who maintains their own business and advertises as much to the
public).
10. Additionally, when one thinks of such a contractor, one thinks of an entity that
advertises their services to the public; for example, a solo law practitioner would carry
business cards advertising his or her practice.
11. See WEIL, supra note 3, at 20.
12. See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees
One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 335–53 (2001);
Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, Is Your Uber Driver an Employee or an Independent
Contractor, 20 PERSPS. ON WORK 30, 30 (2016); John A. Pearce II & Jonathan P. Silva, The
Future of Independent Contractors and Their Status as Non-Employees: Moving on from a
Common Law Standard, 14 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 7–10 (2018).
13. Workers’ compensation laws, in most cases codified by state legislatures, apply only
to legally classified employees. See Juno Turner, Note, All in a Day’s Work? Statutory and
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phenomenon also impacts both the federal and state governments in the form
of lost tax revenue.14 States, in particular, lose out on unemployment and
worker compensation insurance premiums, which turns into a problem when
— as one study on the Maine construction industry found — injured workers
appear on the workers’ compensation payroll only after they are injured.15
The federal government experiences loss of social security taxes, which
employers are required to pay on behalf of employees but not independent
contractors.16
The issue of misclassification is particularly pervasive in the context of
the business model employed by many digital platform companies, which
rely on classifying their workers as independent contractors.17 One
purported rationale for such classification is to ensure that workers have
“flexibility,” namely flexibility to choose when and if they work. 18 Platform
companies, such as Uber, Lyft, and DoorDash, argue that this scenario
benefits individuals who have other commitments during working hours,
allowing them the opportunity to earn extra money in their spare time.19 The

Other Failures of the Workers’ Compensation Scheme as Applied to Street Corner Day
Laborers, FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1531–32 (2005). Workers’ compensation relies on a tradeoff; employees trade away their right to bring a tort lawsuit, while employers, in return,
contribute to a state worker’s compensation insurance fund. See id.
14. See FRANÇOISE CARRÉ & RANDALL WILSON, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF
EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION IN THE MAINE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 2 (2005),
https://scholarworks.umb.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&context=csp_pubs
[https://perma.cc/HH27-DKEQ].
15. See id. This undermines the rationale of workers’ compensation insofar as employers
are not supporting the system they benefit from.
16. See id. Independent contractors themselves must pay these. See generally SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., NO. 05-10022, IF YOU ARE SELF-EMPLOYED (2022), https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN05-10022.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYA7-MHVL].
17. See Li Jin, Scott Duke Kominers & Lila Shroff, A Labor Movement for the Platform
Economy, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 24, 2021), https://hbr.org/2021/09/a-labor-movement-forthe-platform-economy [https://perma.cc/G5YH-ZPLY] (“In the United States, most gig
workers and creators are classified as ‘independent contractors’ . . . . ”).
18. See, e.g., Faiz Siddiqui & Nitasha Tiku, Uber and Lyft Used Sneaky Tactics to Avoid
Making Drivers Employees in California, Voters Say. Now, They’re Going National., WASH.
POST. (Nov. 17, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/
11/17/uber-lyft-prop22-misinformation/
[https://perma.cc/U2WE-L8FM]
(recounting
advertisements paid for by Uber and Lyft highlighting the “independence,” “earnings
opportunities,” and “flexibility” afforded to drivers by the independent contractor model).
19. See Dara Khosrowshahi, Opinion, I Am the C.E.O. of Uber. Gig Workers Deserve
Better., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/10/opinion/uberceo-dara-khosrowshahi-gig-workers-deserve-better.html
[https://perma.cc/9A7Z-PV3R]
(“Unlike traditional jobs, drivers have total freedom to choose when and how they drive, so
they can fit their work around their life, not the other way around. Anyone . . . who’s been
forced to choose between school and work, will tell you this type of freedom has real value
and simply does not exist with most traditional jobs.”).
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theory that employment status limits worker flexibility is unfounded.20
Instead, the more likely explanation for companies’ opposition to such
classification is that they wish to avoid the obligations imposed on them by
federal and state labor laws. Companies have, accordingly, successfully
lobbied for laws that deprive their workers of rights and protections afforded
to workers in other contexts rather than empowering them in the form of
additional earning opportunities.21
This Note highlights how businesses have extended and overused the
independent contractor designation such that it is often applied to workers
who do not fit the original understanding of what the designation describes.22
The birth and explosion of the platform economy have only served to
exacerbate this tension. This is unfair to gig workers, who, in many cases,
perform the same work as those who would traditionally be classified as
“employees,” in some cases for the same hours, without enjoying the
protections and benefits that “employees” have secured.23 Moreover,

20. See NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT & P’SHIP FOR WORKING FAMS., REMOTE CONTROL: THE
TRUTH AND PROOF ABOUT GIG COMPANIES AS EMPLOYERS 3 (2020) [hereinafter REMOTE
CONTROL], https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/NELP-PWF-Fact-Sheet-Remote-Con
trol-Truth-Proof-Gig-Companies-Employers.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TGU-EB8A].
21. See California Proposition 22: App-Based Drivers as Contractors and Labor Policies
Initiative (2020), BALLOTPEDIA [hereinafter California Proposition 22], https://ballotpedia.
org/California_Proposition_22,_App-Based_Drivers_as_Contractors_and_Labor
_Policies_Initiative [https://perma.cc/E626-V38S] (last visited Mar 29, 2022).
22. Exemplifying this phenomenon are those companies which have “replaced”
traditional employees with independent contractors who perform the same work as former
employees. See Mike Dickerson, Vons, Pavilions to Fire “Essential Workers,” Replace
Drivers with Independent Contractors: California Begins to See the Devastating Effects of
Proposition 22, KNOCKLA (Jan. 4, 2021), https://knock-la.com/vons-fires-delivery-driversprop-22-e899ee24ffd0/ [https://perma.cc/7F3Q-SAYJ] (finding that in the wake of
Proposition 22’s passage, California grocery chain Vons replaced its delivery drivers with a
third-party delivery service that hires workers as independent contractors); see also
SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75, at *22 (Jan. 25, 2019) (Member McFerran,
dissenting) (pointing out that SuperShuttle drivers, whom the NLRB majority had found to
be independent contractors excluded from coverage under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), had been treated as employees until 2005).
23. See NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, RIGHTS AT RISK: GIG COMPANIES’ CAMPAIGN TO UPEND
EMPLOYMENT AS WE KNOW IT (2019), https://www.nelp.org/publication/rights-at-risk-gigcompanies-campaign-to-upend-employment-as-we-know-it/ [https://perma.cc/K9TJ-Z85K].
This phenomenon is famously characterized by David Weil as the “fissured workplace.” See
WEIL, supra note 3, at 7. The term describes the modern business model wherein several
degrees of corporate separation divide the employer from the worker. See id. An example of
such divide is the loading dock crewmember, who is paid by a temporary staffing agency that
is in turn compensated for the number of trucks loaded by a company overseeing Walmart’s
distribution center. See id. at 2. Thus, Walmart effectively shields itself from the loading dock
crew, those who are performing essential work for the company. See id. While an extreme
example, it sheds light on the structures that businesses can create so that they may classify
essential workers as independent contractors, and thereby avoid obligations typically owed to
employees. See id.
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misclassification is unfair to employers, who classify workers in good faith,
and society, which must absorb its costs in the form of missing tax revenue.24
Part I of this Note examines the independent contractor designation, its
history, and how digital platform companies have come to exploit the
independent contractor designation for their economic benefit at the expense
of workers who perform work that forms the core of companies’ businesses.
This Part analyzes the application of the existing tests used to determine
employment status for the purposes of protection of the primary employment
statutes. Of particular focus is the application of the ABC test — originating
in Maine in 1935, more recently applied by the California Supreme Court,
and enacted by the California legislature — to workers who participate in the
platform economy.25
Part II of the Note examines whether the traditional binary classification
of independent contractor and employee is sufficient to encompass the gig
economy and addresses whether a third intermediary category is needed. In
addition, this Part analyzes whether a third category, as some scholars have
proposed, holds promise or hinders workers in attaining the benefits and
protections they need to survive, such as health insurance and compensation
for injury on the job. Ultimately, the Note concludes that the employeeindependent contractor binary is workable, even in the context of the
growing “gig economy.”26 However, reforms must be made to ensure that
workers are not deprived of crucial protections.
Part III analyzes the “Concentric Circles” theory of rights allocation
recently proposed by former Deputy Chief of Staff and Senior Policy
Advisor to Administrator Tanya Goldman and former Wage and Hour
Division Administrator David Weil.27 This Note agrees with much of
Goldman’s and Weil’s approach. In particular, this Note agrees that all
workers should be guaranteed certain “fundamental” rights.28 These include

24. See generally NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
MISCLASSIFICATION IMPOSES HUGE COSTS ON WORKERS AND FEDERAL AND STATE TREASURIES
(2020), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Independent-Contractor-Misclassificatio
n-Imposes-Huge-Costs-Workers-Federal-State-Treasuries-Update-October-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RPP6-6XU4].
25. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 12, at 27; see also S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t
of Indus. Rels., 769 P.2d 399, 403 (Cal. 1989); Assemb. B. 5 (Cal. 2019); Christopher J.
Cotnoir, Comment, Employees or Independent Contractors: A Call for Revision of Maine’s
Unemployment Compensation “ABC Test,” 46 ME. L. REV. 325, 332 (1994). This Note
analyzes the ABC test in greater detail in infra Section I.B.iii.
26. See generally Elka Torpey & Andrew Hogan, Working in a Gig Economy, U.S.
BUREAU LAB. STAT. (May 2016), https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2016/article/pdf/whatis-the-gig-economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6UF-W9UB].
27. See Tanya Goldman & David Weil, Who’s Responsible Here?: Establishing Legal
Responsibility in the Fissured Workplace, 42 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 55, 88–113 (2021).
28. See id. at 61.
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freedom from discrimination and retaliation, safe and healthful working
conditions, remuneration for work performed, and assurance of a minimum
wage. Part IV details reservations about Goldman’s and Weil’s “middle
circle.”29 Specifically, it argues that guaranteeing all workers the right to
organize and engage in acts for mutual aid and protection is not feasible in
application to the gig economy, and should instead be based on economic
dependency.30 Furthermore, it asserts that access to injury or disability and
unemployment insurance is crucial, and businesses that provide services
with inherent risks should be responsible for mitigation.31
I. THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR DESIGNATION: ITS GENESIS AS A
“NARROW EXCEPTION” AND ITS APPLICATION TO TODAY’S WORKERS
A. Origins of the Independent Contractor and Its Evolution
The U.S. legal system’s treatment of the independent contractor as a status
distinct from the traditional employee originates in common law tort liability
and the law of agency.32 As of the 1935 publication of the First Restatement
of Agency, whether a firm could be held liable for harms caused by its
workers hinged on whether the worker was an employee or an independent
contractor of that firm.33 At common law, an employer could avoid tort
liability for harms caused by its workers if those workers were, in fact,
independent contractors and not employees.34 An exception to this rule
applied to inherently dangerous businesses. An employer engaged in such
work was liable for injuries caused by the negligence of its workers
regardless of their employment status.35
Later on, with the genesis of New Deal-era federal employment
legislation, classification became determinative of much more than liability
in tort actions. Having an employee meant responsibility for payroll taxes,

29. See id.
30. See id. at 89–101.
31. Goldman and Weil argue that employers should have to rebut the presumption of
employment status to evade responsibility for guaranteeing these rights. See id. at 101.
32. See Charles W. Pierson, A Recent Attempt to Limit the Independent Contractor
Doctrine, 8 YALE L.J. 63, 64 (1898) (discussing early cases addressing the Independent
Contractor Doctrine).
33. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 2 (AM. L. INST. 1933); see also S.G. Borello
& Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., 769 P.2d 399, 403 (Cal. 1989) (en banc) (“The
distinction between independent contractors and employees arose at common law to limit
one’s vicarious liability for the misconduct of person rendering service to him.”).
34. See, e.g., McCafferty v. Spuyten Duyvil & Port Morris R.R. Co., 61 N.Y. 178, 184
(1874).
35. See, e.g., Boylhart v. 200 N.E. 793, 793 (N.Y. 1936); Covington v. Steinbrock, 55
N.E. 618, 619 (Ohio 1899); Carson v. Blodgett Const. Co., 174 S.W. 447, 448 (Mo. Ct. App.
1915).
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contributing to Social Security, and paying time-and-a-half overtime.36
Consequently, the “independent contractor” defense was used by employers
wishing to avoid liability for the protections and benefits afforded by federal
statutes such as the Fair Labor Standards Act,37 National Labor Relations
Act,38 and the Social Security Act,39 and any responsibility for making
contributions to state-mandated worker’s compensation and unemployment
insurance.40 The incentives for employers to misclassify their workers as
independent contractors became significant.41
Likewise, the stakes for workers are high,42 and the impact of
“independent contractor” status on workers is two-fold. For one,
independent contractors lack minimum wage and antidiscrimination
protections, the right to a safe and healthy workplace, and the right to
organize and collectively bargain.43 Additionally, independent contractors
lack insurance in the face of injury or temporary unemployment. 44 On top
of lacking basic workplace protections, independent contractors are required
to pay taxes that are traditionally associated with those who work for
themselves.45 They must deduct Social Security and Medicare taxes from
their wages at the rate of self-employed persons, costs typically shared by
the employer in a traditional employment setting.46 This takes an unjust toll
on workers who are misclassified by self-serving hiring parties.
Importantly, the “gig worker” is particularly vulnerable in the face of
misclassification. For one, the platform economy is less regulated than the
traditional workplace, causing both uncertainty for workers and employers

36. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 15-A, EMPLOYER’S SUPPLEMENTAL TAX
GUIDE 4 (2022); see also Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2)(C).
37. See Walling v. Rutherford Food Corp., 156 F.2d 513, 516 (10th Cir. 1946) (“[T]he
boners were not employees of Kaiser, within the meaning of the Act, but were independent
contractors . . . .”), affirmed sub. nom., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722
(1947).
38. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 113 (1944).
39. See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 705 (1947).
40. See U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., USDL-21-1647, EMPLOYER COSTS FOR EMPLOYEE
COMPENSATION — JUNE 2021 1 (2021), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecec.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M9NY-F4DY].
41. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text.
42. See Sainato, supra note 2.
43. See Lynn Rhinehart et al., Misclassification, the ABC Test, and Employee Status,
ECON. POL’Y INST. (June 16, 2021), https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassification-theabc-test-and-employee-status-the-california-experience-and-its-relevance-to-current-policydebates/ [https://perma.cc/8KYV-XA8P].
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See Self-Employment Tax (Social Security and Medicare Taxes), INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV. (June 19, 2022), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/selfemployment-tax-social-security-and-medicare-taxes [https://perma.cc/6PAF-C4A6].
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involved and a challenge in accounting for this segment of the economy.47
Further, although companies advertise their services to the worker as an
intermediary step to launch her own independent business, this scenario
rarely materializes.48 Because the legal system has largely allowed this
business model to grow unchecked, such workers continue to be deprived of
the rights of traditional employees though a platform service is, in many
cases, their primary source of work.49 Crucially, these workers lack a voice
— in part because they are unprotected by federal legislation guaranteeing
the right to organize and, additionally, because the scattered nature of their
“workplace” is not conducive to this activity.50
Additionally, the fact that such workers are not, in fact, independent
enterprises with many clients, but in fact are, in many cases, reliant on one
or more platform services for their livelihood, makes “deactivation” from
one of these networks potentially devastating.51 Compounding this
precarity, business leadership is both physically and legally removed from
the worker.52 In the background, businesses’ drive for profitability creates

47. See Jay Shambaugh, Ryan Nunn & Lauren Bauer, Independent Workers and the
Modern Labor Market, BROOKINGS INST. (June 7, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfrong/2018/06/07/independent-workers-and-the-modern-labormarket/ [https://perma.cc/S8N
M-FXS6]; see also Torpey & Hogan, supra note 26.
48. Low paying unskilled “gig” jobs draw a largely immigrant workforce. See Lauren
Markham, The Immigrants Fueling the Gig Economy, ATLANTIC (June 20, 2018), https://
www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/06/the-immigrants-fueling-the-gigeconomy/561107/ [https://perma.cc/3E7N-JTF5]. Because these jobs are, in many instances
unskilled and underpaid, workers are not able to use them as a launching point for future
independent businesses of their own. See Sarah Jaffe, The Battle for the Future of “Gig”
Work, VOX (May 18, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/22425152/futureof-gig-work-uber-lyft-driving-prop-22 [https://perma.cc/6DSJ-A2B3].
49. See Maria Figueroa, The Digital Platform Battleground, 25 PERSPS. ON WORK 32, 34
(2021) (recounting a survey in which two-thirds of delivery worker respondents reported
“regularly work[ing] [via platform applications] at least six days per week”).
50. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 157 (applying the Act’s
protections to “employees”); see also Figueroa, supra note 49, at 33–34 (discussing
“challenges” of organizing workers for “location-based digital platforms,” including that
unions have avoided putting resources into developing industries).
51. See Jillian Kaltner, Note, Employment Status of Uber and Lyft Drivers: Unsettling
Settled, 29 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 29, 35 (2018) (“If a driver’s rating falls too low (it is not
specified on the website how low), Uber will deactivate their account thus ending the
‘partnership’ between Uber and the driver.”) (discussing how driver independent contractors
are left unprotected by antidiscrimination legislation). At least some crowdwork platforms
allow customers to decline to compensate workers for any reason. See Crowd Work and the
“On-Demand” Economy, EUR. TRADE UNION INS., https://www.etui.org/topics/health-safetyworking-conditions/hesamag/the-future-of-work-in-the-digital-era/crowd-work-and-the-ondemand-economy [https://perma.cc/XT9V-JG4U] (last visited Feb. 23, 2022).
52. See WEIL, supra note 3, at 94–95 (discussing subcontracting, franchising and supply
chain business models — each of which establishes many legal degrees of separation between
the lead firm and the employees).
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immense incentives for maintaining this multi-tiered organization, leaving
little hope for workers to have more authority in the process.53
In recent years, numerous studies have exposed just how pervasive the
problems of misclassification are. The National Employment Law Project
found that in California, nine out of ten businesses inspected by a state task
force were engaged in illegal misclassification.54 As a result of the burden
imposed by misclassification,55 states have amplified their efforts to curb the
practice.56
The huge incentives for employers to classify workers as independent
contractors are problematic in themselves, particularly because of the
diminished bargaining power workers have in the face of powerful
employers. The problem is mitigated by the enactment of the ABC test,
which presumes employee status unless the hiring party can prove:
(A) that the worker is free from the control . . . of the [hiring entity] . . . ;
(B) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the
hiring entity’s business; and (C) that the worker is customarily engaged in
an independently established trade, occupation, or business . . . .57

Worker advocates champion this test as placing the burden of proof on the
party better able to bear that burden and the one benefitting from the work.58
The widespread enactment of this test is encouraging in this regard.
However, as this Note explores, the test is vulnerable to distortion, as has
been demonstrated by legislative modifications of the “B” prong
implemented in most enacting states.
Ultimately, the employee-independent contractor bifurcation, where one
worker in one jurisdiction is classified as an employee and therefore has the
right to organize, for example, whereas a worker with the same job

53. See id. at 95 (“The downward pressure on wages and associated benefits intensifies
with each cascading tier of fissured employment . . . . ”).
54. See NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, supra note 24, at 3.
55. See id. The report indicates that such misclassification was found by “at least one
[state] agency.” See id. Though not explicitly specified, the report suggests that the agencies
that conducted the audits are those involved in the workers’ compensation and unemployment
insurance systems.
56. See Daniel I. Small et al., NJ Continues Its Aggressive Crackdown on Independent
Contractor Misclassification, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (July 13, 2021), https://www.seyfarth.
com/news-insights/nj-continues-its-aggressive-crackdown-on-independent-contractormisclassification.html [https://perma.cc/Q7BJ-F4HZ].
57. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 7 (Cal. 2018).
58. See Eric Markovits, Note, Easy as ABC: Why the ABC Test Should Be Adopted as the
Sole Test of Employee-Independent Contractor Status, 2020 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 224,
247 (2021); see also Ricard Pochkhanawala, ANALYSIS: Gig Worker Classification Fight
Goes Beyond California, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 2, 2021, 2:28 PM), https://news.bloom
berglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-gig-worker-classification-fight-goes-beyondcalifornia [https://perma.cc/MMW8-2BVW].
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description in another jurisdiction is left without labor protections, is
artificial.59 This issue has been highlighted by the difficulties that gig
workers — some of whom spend substantial time performing essential work
of a platform company — have had in securing basic rights. Further, because
the existing legal bifurcation is artificial and oftentimes counterintuitive,
employers and employees face uncertainty about whether employees will
receive the most basic rights and protections.60 The determination of
employment status is often made ex post facto. The lack of federal guidance
and, thereby, the abundance of litigation in this area, cries out for courts to
devise their own interpretative gloss. Indeed, courts have stepped in as
integral policymakers in this area. The California Supreme Court’s
pacesetting Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court61 decision will
be examined later on, along with the other primary tests that have emerged.
B. Employee Defined: A Patchwork Quilt of Tests
The advent of major New Deal-era employment legislation led to the
classification of workers impacting much more than just tort liability;
employment status has become pivotal in determining what rights and
benefits workers are owed.62 Absent explicit legislative direction,63 courts
are left to grapple with legislative intent, statutory purpose, and precedent to
construct workable tests to determine employment status.64 The pressure to

59. See Veena Dubal, Employment Law: The Employee vs. Independent Contractor
Dichotomy, 2 JUDGES BOOK 51, 53 (2018); see also FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d
492, 503 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (determining that FedEx’s “single-route” drivers were independent
contractors and not protected by the NLRA).
60. For example, federal antidiscrimination legislation, federal statutory minimum wage,
and the right to organize apply only to individuals who satisfy the legal definition of
“employee.” See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (excluding “independent
contractor” from the definition of “employee”); see also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (defining “unlawful employment practice” as employer action against
“employees” or “applicants for employment”); Rutherford Food Corp v. McComb, 331 U.S.
722, 728–29 (1947) (determining whether meat boners are employees for purposes of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA)).
61. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 1.
62. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 12, at 6.
63. See Employee Retirement Income Security Program, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (defining
“employee” as “any individual employed by an employer”); see also Fair Labor Standards
Act, id. § 203(g) (defining employment as “to suffer or permit to work”); Social Security Act
of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 410 (defining employment as “any service . . . by an employee for the
person employing him”); Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 408 (4th
Cir. 2015) (“As the Supreme Court has noted, definitions of ‘employer’ and ‘employee’ in
federal law are circular and ‘explain[] nothing.’” (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992))).
64. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (finding no
contradictory authority preventing the application of the common-law test); cf. id. at 324
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make these tests standardized and, therefore, repeatable stems not only from
the need to provide clarity to workers and hiring parties but also to create a
more useful precedent for courts to follow.
Because of the external factors that courts must consider in determining
the application of this array of statutes, a number of tests have emerged. This
Section examines each standard, how it has been applied and highlights
weaknesses in its application. After describing the primary tests,65 this
Section will explore their use in the context of the platform economy, along
with state legislative efforts to specifically address platform companies and
their workers.
i. The Right to Control Test
The first of the employee-independent contractor classification schemes
to take hold in the United States is the common law “right to control” test.66
Initially, courts developed a set of factors to analyze the extent to which a
hiring entity could be liable for tort damages incurred as a result of its
workers’ actions.67 The doctrine stemmed from the logic that the employer
who has little to no involvement in the day-to-day functioning of its workers
should not be held liable for their actions.68 Today, courts revert to this test
where no other test is prescribed or little guidance is provided by the statute
at issue in a given case.69

(recounting the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on the policy and purpose of Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to reject the common-law approach).
65. This Note describes the three primary categories of extant tests. There is yet a fourth
test devised by various Courts of Appeals — sometimes referred to as a “hybrid” test — that
combines aspects of the common law right to control test and the economic realities test. See,
e.g., Wilde v. Cnty. of Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1994); Frankel v. Bally, Inc.,
987 F.2d 86, 89–90 (2d Cir. 1993). This Note describes the economic realities test in greater
detail at Section I.B.ii infra.
66. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 12, at 7–8; see also Darden, 503 U.S. at 322–23, 327
(reasoning that the common law principles of agency should be used to determine
employment status for purposes of ERISA, where the statute otherwise lacks an instructive
definition of employee). The test has also been widely employed in state court for purposes
of determining responsibility under worker compensation laws. See, e.g., Rolick v. Collins
Pine Co., 925 F.2d 661, 665 (3d Cir. 1991); Hanson v. Transp. Gen., Inc., 716 A.2d 857, 865
(Conn. 1998).
67. See S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., 769 P.2d 399, 403 (Cal. 1989).
68. See Dowsett v. Dowsett, 207 P.2d 809, 811 (Utah 1949).
69. See Comey v. Hill, 438 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Mass. 1982) (resorting to common law
definition of employee absent legislative direction); see also Wilde, 15 F.3d at 105 (“[W]hen
a statute does not helpfully define the term ‘employee,’ courts should not imply a meaning
that is broader than the common-law definition.” (citing Darden, 503 U.S. at 322)).
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While courts have constructed varying iterations of the common law
test,70 they generally draw a distinction between the hiring entity authorized
to specify only the result of the work and the company that has the power to
control how it is accomplished.71 The oft-cited version the U.S. Supreme
Court sets out in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden72 is as follows:
in determining the extent of the hiring entity’s “right to control the manner
and means by which the product is accomplished,” the court investigates
factors, including “skill required,” the supplier of the “instrumentalities and
tools,” the place of work, “the duration of the relationship between the
parties,” the worker’s discretion over his hours, the payment method,
whether the worker can hire assistants, “whether the work is part of the
regular business of the hiring [entity],” whether employee benefits are
provided, and how the worker’s taxes are treated.73
Notwithstanding the discretionary nature of the factors to be applied and
their relative weight,74 the test benefits from its straightforwardness in terms
of the burden of production for the parties involved. For example, it is not
difficult to imagine the type of evidence that a hiring party, a worker, or a
court would need to look towards to determine the party responsible for
paying for equipment and controlling the hours and location of work.
On the other hand, the test is not self-sufficient. That is, the analysis can
depend on the results of other complex findings. For example, the “tax
treatment of the hired party” is dependent on the employer’s determination
of whether, for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, the employer must

70. See Carlson, supra note 12, at 299 (“While judges frequently speak of the ‘common
law’ test of employee status and employment relations, they have generally failed to articulate
any consistent rule or test. Instead, they have perpetuated an ever-expanding catalogue of
‘factors’ . . . .” (internal citation omitted)).
71. See, e.g., Viado v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 217 P.3d 199, 202 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (“An
agent is an employee if the principal has the right to control the physical details of the work
performed by the agent; in other words, the principal directs not only the end result, but also
controls how the employee performs the work.”).
72. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
73. See id. at 323–24. Courts also draw upon the factors enunciated in the Second
Restatement of Agency, which closely resembles the Darden factors, with the addition of
“whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer” and “whether or
not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant.” R ESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (2)(h)–(i) (AM. L. INST. 1988).
74. See Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 106 A.3d 449, 460 (N.J. 2015) (describing the test as
a “totality-of-the-circumstances evaluation”). To note, it is almost uniformly agreed to be a
totality of the circumstances test, with no one factor being determinative. See Pearce & Silva,
supra note 12, at 9. However, the D.C. Circuit created a wrinkle in the consensus when it
decided FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB. 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009). There, the court found
a current of entrepreneurialism to run through its analysis. See id. at 497 (“[W]here some
factors cut one way and some the other, [the determinative principle] is whether the position
presents the opportunities and risks inherent in entrepreneurialism.”).
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pay payroll taxes on account of the worker.75 Whether an employee is an
independent contractor or employee for purposes of this employment tax is,
in turn, determined by no fewer than 20 factors, including elements
themselves analyzing control.76 Additionally, perhaps indicative of its
subjectivity, courts often must resort to legislative purpose to render a
determination.77 Although invoking legislative purpose in close cases may
best reflect congressional intent, it both causes and demonstrates
unpredictability in outcome.78
While bringing in additional factors should seemingly make decisions
more well-grounded in the existence of an employment relationship, the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and Courts of Appeals have
ricocheted between varying interpretations of the common law test, yielding
unpredictable results. In 2009, the D.C. Circuit observed in FedEx Home
Delivery v. NLRB that throughout the test’s history, there was an apparent
underlying focus on the worker’s entrepreneurial opportunity.79 In that case,
the majority found that FedEx drivers’ ability to sell their routes pointed
towards a finding of independent contractor status.80 The right to “sell”
routes without permission from FedEx was indicative of entrepreneurial
opportunity, despite the fact that only two drivers had done so.81
The majority in FedEx pointed to other factors that would seemingly
support employee status under traditional elements of the right to control
test, such as the requirement that workers wear FedEx uniforms, use trucks
sporting the FedEx logo, deliver FedEx customers’ packages each day,
Tuesday through Saturday, and that, of course, the workers performed the
essential part of FedEx’s business — to deliver packages — but held that
these factors were not “determinative” of employee status.82 In sum, the
court found that drivers’ contractual right to sell their routes, along with their
ability to hire assistants, despite evidence that very few had taken advantage
of such abilities, outweighed the numerous indicators of both control and

75. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490
U.S. 730, 752 (1989)); see also Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
76. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 36, at 4–5, 7–9.
77. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944).
78. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968).
79. See 563 F.3d at 497 (“[W]hile all the considerations at common law remain in play,
an important animating principle by which to evaluate those factors in cases where some
factors cut one way and some the other is whether the position presents the opportunities and
risks inherent in entrepreneurialism.”).
80. See id. at 500. The FedEx court found that evidence that the drivers could
contractually assign their routes pointed towards economic independence. See id.
81. As the dissent noted, a factual investigation had revealed evidence of only two route
sales, resulting in dubious profits for the driver. See id. at 515 n.19 (Garland, J., dissenting)
82. See id. at 500–01 (majority opinion).

974

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIX

economic reliance on FedEx.83
The NLRB, during the Obama
Administration, rejected the FedEx Court’s reasoning in FedEx Home
Delivery II and held that rather than focusing on any one factor, courts should
evaluate all of the factors in the Second Restatement of Agency and weigh
them according to the factual circumstances of each case.84 The original
FedEx Court’s gloss was later echoed by the NLRB under the Trump
Administration in SuperShuttle DFW, Inc.,85 and criticized the FedEx II
approach for inventing a new factor altogether by “ask[ing] whether the
evidence tends to show that the putative contractor is, in fact, rendering
services as part of an independent business.”86
ii. The Economic Realities Test
The other primary test, also originating from common law, is termed the
economic realities test. This test is a variation on the right to control test87
and broadens the scope of who gets considered an “employee.”88 In general,
the test examines the financial dependency of the worker on the hiring entity,
looking to the circumstances on the ground as well as certain more
formalized aspects of the right to control test.89
Some scholars maintain that this test was first employed in an early
workers’ compensation opinion by Judge Learned Hand.90 In Lehigh Valley
Coal Co. v. Yensavage, Judge Hand found that the economic dependency of
the coal miner on the defendant-employer, combined with the purpose of the
Worker’s Compensation Act to protect disadvantaged workers, necessitated
a finding of coverage.91

83. See id. at 504; see also id. at 510–11, 515 (Garland, J., dissenting).
84. See FedEx Home Delivery (FedEx II), 361 N.L.R.B. 610, 610 (2014).
85. 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75, at *8 (Jan. 25, 2019).
86. FedEx II, 361 N.L.R.B. at 620 (emphasis added).
87. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 12, at 9.
88. See Walling v. Rutherford Food Corp., 156 F.2d 513, 516 (10th Cir. 1946) (finding
that, due to the Fair Labor Standards Act’s remedial purpose, “coverage is to be determined
broadly by reference to the underlying economic realities rather than by traditional rules
governing legal classifications of master and servant” (emphasis added)); accord Zheng v.
Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying economic realities test, given
that the FLSA includes the “broadest definition of ‘employ’ that has ever been included in
any one act” (internal citation omitted)).
89. See, e.g., Pendleton v. JEVS Hum. Servs., Inc., 463 F. Supp. 3d 548, 561–70 (E.D.
Pa. 2020).
90. See Carlson, supra note 12, at 311; see also Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage,
218 F. 547, 552–53 (2d Cir. 1914) (Hand, J.).
91. 218 F. at 552–53 (“It is true that the statute uses the word ‘employed,’ but it must be
understood with reference to the purpose of the act, and where all the conditions of the relation
require protection, protection ought to be given. It is absurd to class such a miner as an
independent contractor . . . . He has no capital, no financial responsibility. He is himself as
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Others attribute the test’s origination to the Supreme Court’s opinion in
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, where the Court analyzed the meaning of
“employee” as used in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).92 There,
the majority agreed with the NLRB’s findings that the “newsboys” depended
on their earnings from the publishing company and their “sales equipment
and advertising materials” were provided by the publishing company.93
Rejecting “technical concepts” of the workers’ status and relying also on the
purpose of the Act to redress imbalances of power among employers and
employees, the Court affirmed the finding that the newsboys were
“employees” under the NLRA.94
The Supreme Court has since returned to the common law agency factors
when analyzing the question of employee status under the NLRA.95 In 1947,
Congress amended the NLRA to specifically exclude independent
contractors.96 Interpreting this amendment as congressional disapproval of
the economic realities test, the Court rejected that test with respect to NLRA
disputes in favor of the traditional common law agency factors.97
Under the economic realities test, a reviewing court examines six factors:
(1) the extent to which the employer has the right to control the manner in
which the work is completed; (2) the worker’s opportunity for “profit or loss
depending on his managerial skill;” (3) the worker’s “investment in
equipment or materials;” (4) the degree of skill required for the job; (5) the
working relationship’s permanence; and (6) “whether the service rendered is
an integral part of the . . . business.”98

dependent upon the conditions of his employment as the company fixes them as are his
helpers.”).
92. 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944); see also Karen R. Harned, Georgine M. Kryda & Elizabeth
A. Milito, Creating a Workable Legal Standard for Defining an Independent Contractor, 4 J.
BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & L. 93, 101 (2010).
93. 322 U.S. at 131.
94. See id. at 129 (holding that the NLRB’s finding was supported under a rational basis
review).
95. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968).
96. See Robert J. Rosenthal, Exclusions of Employees Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 4 ILR
REV. 556, 565 (1951); see also 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
97. See United Ins., 390 U.S. at 256. The test is also used, in some form, to classify
workers under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, and the
Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988. See Harned et al., supra note 92, at 100. In
addition, the U.S. Department of Labor prescribes the economic realities test to determine
whether an employment relationship exists for purposes of the FLSA. See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.,
WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #13: EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) 1 (2008), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files
/whdfs13.pdf [https://perma.cc/953N-7ZE9].
98. Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979); see also U.S.
DEP’T OF LAB., supra note 97, at 1.
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Though there is considerable overlap between these factors and the
common law test,99 one key difference lies in the economic realities test’s
inclusion of the putative employer’s right to control as a component of the
analysis rather than the base inquiry. Because it is a multi-factor “totality of
the circumstances test,” courts examine other factors besides control, both
contractually and in fact, which may impact the court’s determination of
employee status.100 Additionally, the test looks to factors included in the
common understanding of the “true” independent contractor, pointing to
such factors as the skill required and whether the task performed is in the
usual course of business.101 In utilizing this test, courts often perform their
analysis to effectuate the purpose of the legislation at issue, which typically
points towards a finding of employee status.102
In many ways, the economic realities test highlights important distinctions
between an employee and an independent contractor. When one thinks of an
employee, one thinks of an individual dependent on her employer for work;
when the employer does not have work, neither does the employee.
Additionally, the employer typically supplies the physical space and the tools
required to complete the work.103 Likewise, the employer depends on the
employee to perform the work necessary to conduct its business.104
The economic realities test is used to determine coverage of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA);105 however, its underlying rationale supports a
broader application. Because the employee tends to rely on a single entity
for work and the employer likewise depends on the employee for the
operation of its business, it makes sense to hold the employer responsible for

99. This is particularly true for the first prong, which examines the extent of the putative
employer’s control.
100. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Certainty Versus Flexibility in the Conflict of Laws 2–3
(2019) (on file with University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School) (discussing the inherent
flexibility involved in standards, which require judges to weigh multiple factors versus rules,
which provide certainty and limit opportunity for judicial discretion).
101. See WEIL, supra note 3, at 120 (discussing the legitimate form of independent
contracting where among other things “contractors control their own businesses” and
“maintain their own . . . skills”).
102. See Carlson, supra note 12, at 353–54.
103. These factors are reflected in the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss depending on
managerial skill, and the worker’s investment in equipment or materials. See supra note 98
and accompanying text.
104. This factor is reflected in the sixth factor — whether the employee renders a service
integral to the business. See id.
105. See JON O. SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46765, WORKER CLASSIFICATION:
EMPLOYEE STATUS UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT, AND THE ABC TEST 1 (2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/
pdf/R/R46765#:~:text=Fair%20Labor%20Standards%20Act%2C%20and%20the%20ABC
%20Test,-The%20classification%20of&text=The%20economic%20reality%20test%
20is,of%20a%2040%2Dhour%20workweek [https://perma.cc/HZ5E-PDFS].
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providing basic worker protections like minimum wage, health insurance,
and unemployment insurance in the event of layoffs due to lack of work.
Few courts have had the opportunity to apply the economic realities test
to determine gig workers’ employment status. However, there is potential
for the entrepreneurial opportunity factor to cause uncertainty and deny
certain workers rights in this context. For example, a district court found
that this factor militated in favor of independent status because UberBLACK
drivers were able to choose whether or not to work for Uber, whether they
could work for competitors, and whether they could confine their working
hours to high-demand times to capitalize on “surge” pricing.106 From these
facts, however, an alternative conclusion is equally possible. In contrast to
an independent business entity that has numerous clients to whom they
provide service, UberBLACK drivers chose between different companies for
which they provided services.107 Similarly, choosing to work hours based
on surge pricing does not necessarily prove an opportunity for profit or loss
dependent on managerial skill but rather indicates that Uber has substantial
control over pricing and therefore how much compensation drivers receive.
The economic realities test carries promise to afford workers vital
protections. However, as it stands, the “entrepreneurial opportunity” prong
has been misconstrued such that the test no longer serves its purpose of
avoiding the long and technical right to control analysis in favor of the more
basic inquiry — whether the employee is economically dependent on the
employer.108 The D.C. Circuit and the NLRB under President Trump altered
the test to encompass essentially hypothetical capability, rather than the
“economic facts” of the relation to which the Supreme Court had instructed
the NLRB and reviewing courts to look.109 If the test is to serve its purpose
— of affording economically disadvantaged employees with rights to a
minimum wage110 — the analysis needs to focus on factual evidence rather
than the employees’ putative rights to hire assistants or assign contractual
rights to other individuals.

106. See Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-573, 2018 WL 1744467, at *16–17 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 11, 2018), vacated and remanded, 951 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2020).
107. See id.
108. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 125–28 (1944) (rejecting the “technical
legal refinement [that] has characterized the long evolution of the employee-independent
contractor dichotomy in the courts for other purposes” in favor of an approach that better
serves the purpose of remedying the unequal bargaining power between dependent employees
and their employer).
109. See id. at 128.
110. See Benjamin F. Burry, Comment, Testing Economic Reality: FLSA and Title VII
Protection for Workfare Participants, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 561, 563–64 (2009).
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iii. The ABC Test, Its Enactment by States, and Its
Applications in the Gig Context
1. Overview of the ABC Test
At the state level, a third test known as the ABC test has been enacted with
increasing frequency in recent years. This Note focuses on this test for three
reasons. First, the test has emerged as the prevailing reform for state
independent contractor definitions111 — indeed, 21 states have enacted some
version of the three-pronged test.112 Second, it is the only test to put the
burden on the hiring entity to overcome a presumption that the worker is an
employee.113 Because of this, it has been employed by an increasing number
of states to combat misclassification.114 Additionally, its application to the
platform economy would seem to classify many workers as employees.115
However, a third reason is that some state legislatures have subverted the
test, hindering its potential to provide more assurance to workers and
employers.116
In contrast to the federal tests described above, the ABC test places the
burden on the employer to overcome the presumption that a worker is an
employee. In the seminal Dynamex case, California became the largest state
by population to adopt the ABC test.117 Later, the state legislature approved
its usage when it passed Assembly Bill 5 (AB 5), which codified and
expanded the Dynamex holding to apply to all workers.118

111. Pearce & Silva, supra note 12, at 27.
112. This number reflects states who have adopted the test in any form, not those limited
to the form the California Supreme Court outlined in Dynamex. See SHIMABUKURO, supra
note 105, at 14–27.
113. See id. at 1.
114. See id. at 9 n.90.
115. To classify a worker as an independent contractor, the employer must prove that the
worker performs work outside the ordinary operations of the busines. See infra text
accompanying note 124. For platform companies providing transportation services, it would
seem difficult to prove that a driver does not perform functions essential to the business.
116. Because of the potential for widespread liability, platform companies have expended
extraordinary resources towards lobbying state legislatures to make an exemption for online
intermediaries. See Rebecca Smith, ‘Marketplace Platforms’ and ‘Employers’ Under State
Law — Why We Should Reject Corporate Solutions and Support Worker-Led Innovation,
NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (May 18, 2018), https://www.nelp.org/publication/marketplaceplatforms-employers-state-law-reject-corporate-solutions-support-worker-led-innovation/
[https://perma.cc/HM6G-PVK8].
117. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 3 (Cal. 2018).
118. See Assemb. B. 5, ch. 296 (Cal. 2019); see also SHIMABUKURO, supra note 105, at 12
n.112. AB 5 codifies Dynamex, where the California Supreme Court held the ABC test applies
to California wage laws and expands its holding to include the entirety of the California Labor
Code and state unemployment insurance laws. See Todd H. Lebowitz & Mark Zisholtz, Now
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This phenomenon is not limited to California. The ABC test “has been
adopted [in full] in at least 20 states and the District of Columbia.” 119 In 18
of 20 such states, the test has been incorporated into unemployment
insurance laws.120 In many states, the ABC test is used to determine
employee status for purposes of laws setting mandatory minimum wages,
and in a handful of states — construction-industry specific laws.121 It has
been estimated that as many as 38 states have adopted the ABC test in some
form.122 One likely explanation for the recent trend among states to codify
the ABC test into law is its potential to function as a tool to combat
widespread misclassification.123
Under the framework the California Supreme Court envisioned, workers
are presumed to be employees unless and until the employer can prove the
existence of three factors suggestive of independent contractor status:
(A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity
in connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for
the performance of the work and in fact, (B) that the worker performs work
that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business, and (C) that
the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation or business . . . .124

Because the ABC test presumes an employment relationship unless the
employer satisfies each of the three factors, the ABC test, in comparison to
the other primary tests, poses the biggest hurdle for employers to overcome
if they wish to classify their workers as independent contractors. For
example, if the business successfully shows that (A) it lacks control over the
worker and that (C) the worker is customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, but (B) the worker does not perform the work provided
outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business, the worker still would
be classified as an employee. Because of this, employers face a major
challenge in escaping liability under its application than under the other tests

That California Has Passed AB 5, What Are the Options for Businesses Using Independent
Contractors?, 45 EMP. RELS. L.J. 38, 38 (2020).
119. See SHIMABUKURO, supra note 105, at 1. That said, states that have adopted a version
of the ABC test have not mirrored California’s version and have undermined its efficacy. See
infra Section II.B.iii.2.
120. See SHIMABUKURO, supra note 105, at 18–27.
121. See id.
122. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 12, at 27.
123. See generally Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing, ABC on the Books and in the
Courts: An Analysis of Recent Independent Contractor and Misclassification Statutes, 18 U.
PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 53, 67 (2015).
124. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 40 (Cal. 2018).
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because any one factor is dispositive.125 Not surprisingly, worker advocates
champion the test for being the hardest for employers to manipulate.126
The ABC test certainly holds promise to guarantee workers crucial
protections, ones they might not otherwise enjoy under the alternative tests.
Specifically, as stated above, states have largely enacted the ABC test to
determine employee status for purposes of unemployment insurance.127 The
test has also been employed, in some variation, to determine employee status
for purposes of state workers’ compensation laws.128 As Judge Hand noted
in Lehigh Valley, workers’ compensation is vital assurance that a worker
financially dependent on his employer will not suffer financial ruin from the
inevitable workplace injury, particularly in an industry such as mining.129
Likewise, it is crucial that the worker have assurance that during periodic
spans of time without employment, outside of the worker’s control, he will
have the means to survive.
Additionally, the ABC test benefits from its apparent simplicity. With
only three factors to apply, in contrast to, say, the 13 factors set forth by the
Court in Darden, there is more certainty in the outcome, a benefit for
employers, workers, and courts.130
2. ABC Test: A Problematic Subversion
a. Prong B: Outside of the Employer’s Places of Business
While the ABC test holds promise to assure workers vital protections, the
vast majority of state legislatures have subverted Prong B to include a
geographical component,131 such that it risks misclassifying workers who
should properly be considered employees.
The Dynamex version of Prong B requires the employer to prove that the
worker performs services outside of the employer’s ordinary course of
business.132 This formulation makes sense in light of the traditional

125. See id. at 41 (“[E]ach part of the ABC test may be independently determinative of the
employee or independent contractor question . . . .”).
126. See Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 123, at 67 (“Worker advocates have called
ABC the ‘most objective’ test and ‘the most difficult for employers to manipulate.’”).
127. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-222(B) (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151A, § 2
(2022).
128. See Assemb. B. 5 § 1(e) (Cal. 2019).
129. See Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552–53 (2d Cir. 1914).
130. See Carlson, supra note 12, at 299 (describing how the lists of factors courts apply are
frequently “nonexhaustive” and “ever-expanding,” rendering the “analysis . . . more complex
and its outcome less predictable.”). In addition, Carlson points out the multi-factor common
law test “begs the question of employee status as much as answers it.” Id.
131. See Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 123, at 100.
132. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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conception of the independent contractor — one who is in business for
herself — in contrast to an employee who performs the integral work of the
business.133 For example, “an outside plumber repairing a leak in a retail
store is not part of the store’s usual course of business,”134 whereas a tailor
regularly hired by a dry cleaner to perform alterations would likely be
considered a part of the dry cleaning business.135
Yet, several states have subverted the analysis by including a geographical
component.136 These states allow the employer to show that the worker
either performs services outside the usual course of the business (as in the
traditional test) or outside of the places of business of the firm for which the
service is performed.137 Nineteen states have enacted the test in some form
for unemployment insurance law coverage.138 All but two of these laws
include the place of business clause.139 Further, the vast majority of these
states have not enacted the ABC test in the workers’ compensation realm.140
The workers’ compensation statutes of these states range from providing
specific exclusions for independent contractors141 to providing vague or non-

133. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 12–13 (Cal. 2018).
134. People v. Uber Techs., Inc., 270 Cal. Rptr. 3d 290, 311 (Ct. App. 2020).
135. See id.
136. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:1472(12)(e)(ii) (2014); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMP. §
8-205(a)(3)(ii) (West 2022).
137. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-222(a)(1)(B) (2012).
138. See SHIMABUKURO, supra note 105, at 14–27.
139. Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Vermont,
Washington, and West Virginia incorporate the “place of business” clause. See id. Just two
states — Maine and California — require proving that the worker perform work outside the
usual course of the hiring entity’s business. See id.
140. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.395 (2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-275 (2022); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2301 (2022); HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-1 (2017); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
305/1 (2022); LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:1021 (2022); ME. STAT. tit. 39, § 102(13)(B) (2021); MD.
CODE ANN. LAB. & EMP. § 9-101 (West 2022); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 152, § 1(4) (2022); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 48-114 (2022); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:2 (2021); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 511-42 (2021); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (2022); N.J. DEP’T OF LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV’T, AN
EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN NEW JERSEY 5–6, https://www.nj.
gov/labor/forms_pdfs/wc/pdf/WC-373.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EGA-LR6M] (last visited Mar.
22, 2022); WASH. DEP’T OF LAB. & INDUS., EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
INSURANCE IN WASHINGTON STATE 2–3 (2020), https://www.lni.wa.gov/formspublications/F101-002-000.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3X2-B4HH]. Vermont is seemingly the
only state to enact the ABC test in this context. See VT. DEP’T OF LAB., WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE
VS. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, https://labor.vermont.gov/sites/labor/files/doc_library/Who
%20is%20an%20Employee%20vs.%20Independent%20Contractor.pdf [https://perma.cc/C
WD8-T7ZC] (last visited Mar. 17, 2022). It is worth noting that California, a foremost
proponent of the ABC test, has not enacted it in the workers compensation context. See CAL.
LAB. CODE § 2750.3 (2020) (repealed 2020).
141. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.395 (2022).
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definitions of employees.142 Lacking a statute with an instructive definition,
reviewing courts resolving workers’ compensation disputes have applied the
common law agency test143 and another common law test known as the
“relative nature of the work test.”144
Omitting a statutory definition of employee in workers’ compensation
acts indicates that state legislatures intend for courts to resort to the commonlaw agency test or another such common law test in resolving coverage
disputes.145 One possible rationale for hinging employee status for workers’
compensation coverage on the common law definition is the agency factors’
roots in tort liability.146 Perhaps states view employers as appropriately
responsible for insuring against on-the-job injuries, where those employers
would be vicariously liable for harms resulting from the workers’
performance of their jobs.147 On the contrary, if the employer would not
incur tort liability for a worker’s injurious acts, the employer would not be
held responsible for insuring against that worker’s injury.
It is impossible to identify with certainty a policy explanation for the
application of the ABC test in the unemployment insurance context but not
others; however, it is worth examining more closely the implications. In
contrast to the Dynamex version of the ABC test, the incorporation of the
geographical component, as in the vast majority of states, makes it more
likely that an employer would be able to avoid employee classification and,
therefore, evade the obligation to contribute unemployment insurance funds

142. See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (2022).
143. See DeJesus v. R.P.M. Enters., Inc., 255 A.3d 885, 908 (Conn. Ct. App. 2021); see
also Harger v. Structural Servs., Inc., 916 P.2d 1324, 1329 (N.M. 1996).
144. See Odsather v. Richardson, 96 P.3d 521, 523 (Alaska 2004). The relative nature of
the work test is another multi-factor test that inquires about “the character of the claimant’s
work or business; and . . . the relationship of the claimant’s work or business to the purported
employer’s business.” Id. (quoting Benner v. Wichman, 874 P.2d 949, 952 (Alaska 1994)).
These questions themselves require the consideration of numerous factors. Scrutinizing the
nature of the claimant’s work includes looking at: “(1) the degree of skill involved, (2)
whether the claimant holds himself out to the public as a separate business, and (3) whether
the claimant bears the accident burden.” Id. The relationship between the claimant’s work and
the putative employer’s business is investigated with reference to:
(1) the extent to which claimant’s work is a regular part of the employer’s regular
work, (2) whether the claimant’s work is continuous or intermittent, and (3) whether
the duration of the work is such that it amounts to hiring of continuing services
rather than a contract for a specific job.
Id.; see also Brush Hay & Mill. Co. v. Small, 388 P.2d 84, 87 (Colo. 1963) (en banc).
145. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 12, at 7–8.
146. See supra Section I.A.
147. See supra Section I.A. This argument is supported by the fact that contributions to
workers’ compensation insurance contributions relieve employers of liability for employee
tort actions. See generally David B. Torrey et al., Recent Developments in Workers’
Compensation and Employers’ Liability Law, 52 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L. 709 (2017).
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on behalf of its workers.148 However, implementing the ABC test in either
form provides greater certainty in application due to its evaluation of
relatively few and easy-to-apply standards.149 And, in either form, the test
should render more employers responsible than would the traditional
common law agency test. It is possible that states view unemployment
insurance misclassification as a more pressing problem; while workplace
accidents may occur sporadically,150 an economic downturn can affect
millions, as exemplified by the surge in unemployment during the COVID19 pandemic.151 The frequency and severity of the problem corresponds to
the financial impact on the government.152 In other words, when employers
do not provide workers benefits and the individual cannot subsidize the costs,
those costs must later be defrayed, in some form, by the state via public
assistance.153
There are huge ramifications to the geographic subversion of Prong B in
the context of the platform economy as applied to “location-based work,”
such as rideshare or crowdsourcing work.154 For example, almost all
workers providing transportation services would surely be considered to
perform work outside of the enterprise’s place of business.155 Yet, there is

148. Allowing the employer to prove that the employee works outside the employer’s
places of business provides the employer with another route to proving independent contractor
status. See Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 123, at 100–01.
149. See SHIMABUKURO, supra note 105, at 10.
150. Actual medical costs — as opposed to lost wages — would also in most cases be
covered by insurance, as even low-salaried workers would be covered by Medicaid, already
required to be funded by the state.
151. See Rhinehart et al., supra note 43, at 8–9.
152. See NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, PUBLIC TASK FORCES TAKE ON EMPLOYEE
MISCLASSIFICATION: BEST PRACTICES 3 (2020), http://stage.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/Pol
icy-Brief-Public-Task-Forces-Take-on-Employee-Misclassification.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H4CC-2D8E].
153. For example, the government must compensate for uncompensated medical care. See
Teresa A. Coughlin, Haley Samuel-Jakubos & Rachel Garfield, Sources of Payment for
Uncompensated Care for the Uninsured, KFF (Apr. 6, 2021), https://www.kff.org/uninsure
d/issue-brief/sources-of-payment-for-uncompensated-care-for-the-uninsured/ [https://perma.
cc/S3KC-9S8P]; see also Rhinehart et al., supra note 43, at 8–9 (“[U]nemployment benefits
for independent contractors . . . are paid for by taxpayers . . . . Tens of thousands of Uber and
Lyft drivers have accessed these programs, meaning that the federal government — and
taxpayers — financially supported the drivers through the pandemic, not Uber and Lyft.”);
NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, supra note 152, at 3.
154. See Figueroa, supra note 49, at 33–34 (distinguishing digital platforms providing
services such as “design” and “computer programming” from “[l]ocation-based platforms”
connecting consumers with “on-demand” services in the “transportation, food/goods delivery,
house chores, and personal care” industries).
155. See Athol Daily News v. Bd. of Rev. of Div. of Emp. & Training, 786 N.E.2d 365,
372 (Mass. 2003). Like in this case, as discussed in infra note 156, transportation workers are
mobile and could therefore be considered by courts to work outside the employer’s place of
business.
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no sensible rationale for denying newspaper delivery couriers job-related
protections solely because their work necessitates mobility.156 Likewise, in
the platform economy, it is hard to imagine an instance in which a platform
company in the transportation or food delivery industries, with offices in San
Francisco, New York, and other urban areas,157 would not win on that prong,
likely implicating this segment of the “gig” workforce. On the other end of
the “gig” spectrum, individuals who work for digital platforms such as
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, even if working full-time for the platform,
would likely fail to qualify as employees under this condition.
The ABC test has the potential to uproot the employment practices of
platform companies. Harbingers of its further enactment have indeed caused
anxiety for platform executives, as evidenced by recent political reactions by
Uber and Lyft.158 After the passage of AB 5,159 Uber and Lyft, in an attempt
to avoid expensive employment obligations, successfully lobbied for
Proposition 22 (Prop 22), an exemption for rideshare drivers.160 Further,
efforts to codify some version of the ABC test have encountered legislative
backlash,161 as is highlighted by bills outlining lengthy classification
frameworks specifically applicable to platform workers.162 These bills have
the clear impact of rendering almost all, if not all, platform workers
independent contractors.
Unsurprisingly, platform companies have
156. See id. at 372–73 (“It is clear that all of the carriers make deliveries outside of
premises owned by the News or which could fairly be deemed its ‘places of business.’”)
(distinguishing a case involving a bicycle courier business, which business was “virtually
indistinguishable from the services performed by the bicycle couriers”). A Massachusetts
appellate court found that taxi limousine drivers were independent contractors for the same
reason. Comm’r of the Div. of Unemployment Assistance v. Town Taxi of Cape Cod, 862
N.E.2d 430, 435 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (“Drivers were not confined to a specific geographical
location and were free to choose locations where they would look for passengers.”).
157. See Uber Headquarters and Office Locations, CRAFT, https://craft.co/uber/locations
[https://perma.cc/YGV7-YAHW] (last visited Mar. 30, 2022).
158. See California Proposition 22, supra note 21.
159. Aseemb. B. ch. 296 (Cal. 2019).
160. The provision exempts app-based drivers from AB 5’s coverage. See California
Proposition 22, supra note 21. Advertisements worked to convince the public that Prop 22
would afford workers “flexibility,” which allegedly they were not granted under AB 5, while
at the same time providing protections. See Khosrowshahi, supra note 19 (stating that if
drivers were classified as employees, they would “lose the flexibility they have”). But see
REMOTE CONTROL, supra note 20, at 3 (“There is no law or policy that requires employers to
take away flexibility if workers receive employee benefits.”). Uber and Lyft are also eyeing
Massachusetts, a state with employee-friendly classification laws, as a potential target for a
Prop 22-like initiative. See Pat Murphy, Prop 22 Win Has Uber, Lyft Eyeing Bay State as New
Battleground,
MASS.
LAWS.
WKLY.
(Nov.
19,
2020),
https://masslawyersweekly.com/2020/11/19/prop-22-win-has-uber-lyft-eyeing-bay-state-asnew-battleground/ [https://perma.cc/C7JP-GH8R].
161. This is a different form of backlash than that referred to with respect to the geography
limitation imposed on prong B. See supra notes 136–44 and accompanying text.
162. See Smith, supra note 116.
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themselves lobbied for these laws, known as “marketplace contractor”
laws.163 A Tennessee law sets forth ten factors that determine whether a
worker for a platform company is an independent contractor that essentially
mirror the business model that platform companies have constructed.164
Perversely, one factor weighed in favor of finding independent contractor
status requires that the company “provide[] no medical or other insurance
benefits to the marketplace contractor,”165 effectively discouraging platform
companies from providing such benefits. Nearly identical laws have been
passed in Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, and Kentucky. 166
Unsurprisingly, in the face of the seemingly iron-clad Prong B, platform
companies have attempted to argue that worker “service providers” carry out
a different function from the services themselves.167 As the argument goes,
Uber is not in the transportation industry but in the business of connecting
consumers with drivers.168 This attempt is also reflected in platform
companies’ tendency to rename their workers as “partners”169 or “pros.”170
Altering the nomenclature to further disguise the fact that workers perform
work that is the lifeblood of the platforms’ business is a transparent effort by
platform companies to avoid creating any impression of employment status.
Granted, this argument has been largely unpersuasive, as courts have tended
to see this argument’s hollowness for what it is.171
b. Prong A: Contract Requirement
In addition to mirroring the text of Prong B set forth in Dynamex, the ABC
test’s viability depends on the maintenance of Prong A’s requirement that
163. See id. (reporting that, at least in Tennessee, Handy provided the draft legislation).
164. See TENN. CODE § 50-8-102 (2019).
165. See id. § 50-8-102(a)(9).
166. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1603 (2016); FLA. STAT. § 451.02 (2019); IND. CODE
§ 22-1-6-3 (2019); IOWA CODE § 93.2 (2020); KY. REV. STAT. § 336.137 (West 2021). These
laws set forth the definition for employment status across all employment laws, that is, worker
compensation, unemployment compensation, and state minimum wage laws.
167. See, e.g., People v. Uber Techs., Inc., 270 Cal. Rptr. 3d 290, 302 (Ct. App. 2020).
168. See id.
169. See Get Ready to Drive with Us, UBER, https://www.uber.com/hk/en/drive/how-itworks/ [https://perma.cc/S624-ZE3Q] (last visited Mar. 7, 2022).
170. See Be a Professional with Handy!, HANDY, https://www.handy.com/apply
[https://perma.cc/9J9Z-E5VH] (last visited Mar. 30, 2022); see also Valerio De Stefano, The
Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand Work, Crowdwork, and Labor Protection
in the “Gig Economy,” 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 472 (2016) (discussing the
“commodification of work” exemplified by catchphrases such as “‘gigs,’ ‘tasks,’ ‘rides,’
etc.”).
171. See Uber, 270 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 311–12 (“A number of cases have considered
contentions that ride-sharing companies such as Lyft and Uber are in the business solely of
creating technological platforms . . . . Uber has been . . . unsuccessful in making [this] pitch
to the courts.”).
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the employer withholds control both contractually and in fact.172 The
problem with hinging employment status on contract terms is that it opens
the door for the employer to manipulate the terms of the contract to give an
appearance of lack of control when, in reality, the employer exercises control
over the manner in which the work is performed.173 For example, the
independent contractor agreement DoorDash requires its workers to sign
states that the worker, among other things, “understands . . . they have the
sole right to control the manner in which deliveries are performed and the
means by which those deliveries are completed.”174 This arrangement is
true, in some sense — drivers for such apps are told when and where to pick
up food and to have it delivered but precisely how they get there is
discretionary. However, as will be explained below, the app exercises
control in more subtle ways, which is not the case in a traditional independent
contractor scenario. If the ABC test relies solely on contractual terms, the
test risks disguising actual control with carefully chosen contractual
language.
On the one hand, per the agreement, delivery couriers working for
DoorDash are free to choose their own mode of transportation and are not
required to display “any signage or other designation of DoorDash on their
vehicle or person.”175 It may very well be the case that workers do have the
freedom to drive their own cars, ride their own bikes, and choose to work
only during certain times of the day. On the other hand, in reality, the
company exercises employer-like control over many aspects of the work.
For example, DoorDash and other food delivery platforms exercise
“technical control” over which customers couriers are matched with and, in
some cases, withhold detailed information about the nature of the job
request, such as the distance to be traveled and how much pay the worker

172. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 34:20-4(a) (2016).
173. See Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 123, at 68–69 (discussing how the
variation opens the door for employers to “contractually designate a worker as an independent
contractor, while in reality preserving employer-like control”). It also opens the door for
courts to examine the actual day-to-day relationship of the parties less carefully in favor of
basing analysis solely on the terms of the contract. See Hair v. La. Crane & Trucking Co., 996
So. 2d 435, 436–37 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (determining that despite the “harsh” result, because
the written contract between the injured truck driver and the employer stated that the
individual was required to provide his own workers’ compensation insurance, the employer
did not need to supply workers’ compensation benefits).
174. Independent Contract Agreement — United States, DOORDASH, https://help.doordash
.com/dashers/s/ica-us?language=en_US [https://perma.cc/3UZK-WR4H] (last visited Mar. 7,
2022).
175. See id.
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will take home.176 Additionally, the platforms exercise control over pricing
and enact practices that likely inure to the benefit of the platform. 177
While courts do seem to all but uniformly see through attempts by
employers to use “sham independent contractor agreements”178 to avoid
obligations imposed by employment laws,179 the marketplace contractorspecific laws discussed above do signal a possible legislative pitfall. These
laws, in some cases, require only that the contractor agreement reflect certain
conditions, such as the worker’s flexibility in working hours, responsibility
for expenses incurred on the job, and the worker’s own payment of
employment taxes.180
The potential for problematic legislative exemptions to the ABC test does
highlight a strength of the economic realities test. The economic realities
test acknowledges that whatever arrangement is in effect between the parties
may be superseded by the reality of the financial dependence of the worker
on his employer.181 As courts have noted, this approach often carries out the
purpose of employment legislation, which is to remedy power and economic
imbalances between the employer and the employee by mandating the
provision of employment benefits and protections, which employers might
otherwise be incentivized to withhold.
iv. Viability of the Employee-Independent Contractor Dichotomy
in the Context of the Gig Economy
In some ways, the problem with the legal employee-independent
contractor dichotomy is that there is one at all. The fact that there are multifactor, judicially-contrived tests leads one to wonder what, if anything, about
the legal “employee” status makes certain workers deserving of protections

176. See Kathleen Griesbach et al., Algorithmic Control in Platform Food Delivery Work,
5 SOCIUS 1, 6 (2019).
177. For example, DoorDash offers “set rates of ‘bonus pay’ during times peak demand
times.” See id. at 5. Workers for Instacart (a grocery-delivery app) have speculated that the
platform learns the worker’s bottom line, the lowest wage they are “likely to accept, and then
tailors offers to each accordingly.” See id. at 6; see also WEIL, supra note 3, at 121 (describing
the business’s control over pricing, “timing, place of delivery, and so on” and the provision
of “clear standards, guidelines, monitoring, and penalties . . . about the consequences to the
subcontractor if it fails to meet the guidelines. This is the glue that holds subcontractors to the
outcomes that are central to the lead firm’s core competency.”).
178. Sw. Appraisal Grp., LLC v. Adm’r, 155 A.3d 738, 745 (Conn. 2017).
179. See Carlson, supra note 12, at 341–42; see also James v. Uber Techs. Inc., 338 F.R.D.
123, 136 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (rejecting Uber’s argument against class certification based on
differences among drivers’ contracts because despite the agreements, “a jury could find that
Uber exercised no control — or too much control — over its drivers under all of the
agreements, despite their differences”).
180. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1603(A)(3) (2016).
181. See discussion supra Section I.B.ii.
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while others are not.182 This difficulty is highlighted by the fact that two
tribunals can analyze similar fact patterns and reach different conclusions
about whether a worker is an employee for purposes of certain legislation by
using different tests.183 Underscoring the artificiality of the distinction is the
puzzling reality that a driver for Uber in California, after the passage of AB
5 and before the passage of Prop 22, would be classified as an employee and,
therefore, entitled to workers compensation, unemployment insurance, paid
sick and family leave, and health insurance,184 whereas an Uber driver in
Pennsylvania might not be entitled to those same rights merely because of
the classification scheme of the state in which she works.185
Despite the seeming arbitrariness of the distinction, overhauling the
current employee-independent contractor bifurcation in the foreseeable
future seems unlikely, considering it is rooted in common law stemming
from a century ago. There is also substantial Supreme Court precedent for
engaging in such multi-factor analyses across a broad range of legislation,
and about half of states have recently passed a law that, while reformative,
still maintains the binary classification scheme. This Section discusses
proposals to create a third category to encompass hard-to-classify
employees, ultimately concluding that its implementation is impracticable.
Additionally, crafting employment legislation, particularly surrounding
the “gig” economy, seems inextricably enmeshed in party politics, rendering
sweeping changes unlikely.186 The successful disguise of Prop 22 as a pro-

182. Carlson, supra note 12, at 299–300; see also Hanson v. Transp. Gen., Inc., 716 A.2d
857, 860–61 (Conn. 1998) (discussing the Connecticut Supreme Court’s long-standing
invocation of the right to control test absent explicit legislative instruction).
183. Currently, “[i]t is . . . the case, particularly in state law, that a worker may be an
employee for one purpose and an independent contractor for another, especially in any state
that has adopted the . . . ‘ABC test.’” Carlson, supra note 12, at 354. This is a separate but
equally puzzling issue.
184. This is unless the employer can successfully prove independent contractor status
under the ABC test. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(a)(1)(A)–(C) (West 2020) (repealed 2020).
185. For example, a court that sits in a state still utilizing one of the traditional common
law tests could find that on balance, the sum total of the factors cut against a finding of
employment status; i.e., such a court might find that because the driver supplies his own
vehicle and controls if and when he works, the economic realities of the arrangement point
towards independence. See Goldman & Weil, supra note 27, at 111 (showing how a
hairdresser might be deemed an employee or an independent contractor depending on one’s
interpretation, versus under the ABC test, where that worker would almost surely be
considered an employee).
186. Arizona, Florida, Iowa, and Indiana — states that have enacted marketplace contractor
laws — have Republican governors and Republican control of the state senate. See State
Government Trifectas, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/State_government_trifectas [htt
ps://perma.cc/B6EB-ZXJP] (last visited Mar. 22, 2022). Kentucky’s former Republican
governor signed the state’s marketplace contract bill into law. See H.B. 220, Reg. Sess. (Ky.
2018); Kentucky Gubernatorial and Lieutenant Gubernatorial Election, 2015, BALLOTPEDIA,
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worker bill, and the enactment of marketplace contractor laws in several
states demonstrate the immense lobbying power of platform companies.187
It is possible that states, feeling the effects of lost tax revenue in the form of
missing
unemployment
insurance
and
worker
compensation
contributions,188 will be forced to recalibrate. Pervasive misclassification
has indeed inspired legislative reform. For example, proponents of the ABC
test have garnered support for its application to the construction industry —
an industry in which misclassification is known to be rampant.189 At the
same time, there is a strong possibility that additional states will follow the
lead of the meaningful minority of states that have codified the ABC test in
its improper form.
II. DISRUPTING THE DICHTONOMY: THE DEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
A. Proposal of a Third Category
Some scholars, confronted with the inconsistent and counterintuitive
nature of the independent contractor-employee distinction, have questioned
whether a bifurcated classification system makes sense at all in the modern
economy.190 One proposal, which resembles systems already in place in
Canada and the United Kingdom,191 advocates creating a third category of

https://ballotpedia.org/Kentucky_gubernatorial_and_lieutenant_gubernatorial_election,_201
5 [https://perma.cc/SM4Q-Q4YF] (last visited Mar. 22, 2022).
187. See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text.
188. See J. Paul Leigh, Economic Burden of Occupational Injury and Illness in the United
States, 89 MILBANK Q. 728, 745 (2011).
189. See Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 123, at 69 (discussing prong A’s
contractual provision, which at the time had only been enacted in four states and two of those
states had applied that language solely to the construction industry); see also Rhinehart et al.,
supra note 43, at 5 (discussing the “rampant” misclassification of workers in the construction
industry). Another possible factor in this industry-specific application is that is that
construction is a notoriously dangerous industry. See Jason Ryser, Is Construction Work the
Most Dangerous Industry?, FLICKINGER SUTTERFIELD & BOULTON (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://utahinjurylawyers.com/is-construction-work-the-most-dangerous-industry/
[https://perma.cc/K5RP-RXEY] (“The construction industry is infamous for being one of the
most dangerous fields to work in . . . . [T]his type of work . . . results in thousands of nonfatal injuries that cost companies millions each year.”). Perhaps states do not want to be left
to pick up the tab in instances of inevitable on-the job injury. See Leigh, supra note 188, at
728–29; see also N.J. REV. STAT. § 34:20-4 (2022) (defining construction employee, for
purposes of several employment statutes including Temporary Disability Benefits, according
to the ABC test).
190. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 12, at 30.
191. The 1995 Ontario Labor Relations Act defines the dependent worker as encompassing
both contracted and uncontracted workers who are “in a position of economic dependence
upon, and under an obligation to perform duties for, [another] person more closely resembling
the relationship of an employee than that of an independent contractor.” Labour Relations
Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, ch. 1, sched. A, § 1 (Can.).
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worker — the independent worker, otherwise known as a “dependent
contractor.”192
In 1975, Canada introduced the concept of the “dependent worker” into
labor statutes to expand coverage beyond traditional employees.193 The 1995
Ontario Labor Relations Act defines the dependent worker as encompassing
both contracted and uncontracted workers who are “in a position of
economic dependence upon, and under an obligation to perform duties for,
[another] person more closely resembling the relationship of an employee
than that of an independent contractor.”194 In 1992, the Ontario Labor
Relations Board, an independent body that, like the NLRB, adjudicates labor
disputes, decided that drivers working for a taxi dispatcher who “derive[d] a
substantial proportion of their income on a regular basis” from fares obtained
via the dispatcher’s system should properly be classified as dependent
contractors.195 Recently, in the context of the gig economy, the NLRB ruled
that delivery couriers working for food-delivery app Foodora were
employees.196
While this system has not yet gained traction in the United States, some
scholars have proposed that the third category may encompass workers
occupying the legal gray area; those sharing qualities with both traditional
employees and independent contractors.197 To these supporters, it is not
clear that the platform intermediary should bear responsibility for their

192. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 12, at 30. See generally SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B.
KRUEGER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT WORKER” (2015).
193. See Miriam A. Cherry & Antonio Aloisi, “Dependent Contractors” in the Gig
Economy: A Comparative Approach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 635, 653 (2017); see also David
Doorey, The Classification of “Gig” Workers in Canadian Work Law, ON LAB. (July 7, 2020),
https://onlabor.org/the-classification-of-gig-workers-in-canadian-work-law/
[https://perma.cc/W5V6-XPR9]. The “dependent contractor” status has been introduced into
some but not all employment legislation in Canada — for example, while the dependent
contractor is included in collective bargaining legislation, it is not yet incorporated into wage
standards laws. See Ryan White, How the Ontario Labour Board Ruled Foodora Workers Are
“Employees” and Not Independent Contractors, L. WORK (Mar. 5, 2020),
https://lawofwork.ca/how-the-ontario-labour-board-ruled-foodora-workers-are-employees/
[https://perma.cc/R5SC-NQXS].
194. Labour Relations Act § 1.
195. See Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union (AFL) v. Diamond Taxicab Ass’n
(Toronto) Ltd., 1992 CanLII 6786, ¶ 45 (Can. Ont. Lab. Rels. Bd. 1992).
196. See White, supra note 193.
197. Opponents of according gig workers “full” employment status cite their ability to
choose to work — or not at all. As such, the employment relationship can be “fleeting,
occasional, or constant, at the discretion of the independent worker.” See HARRIS & KRUEGER,
supra note 192, at 9. On the other hand, the gig worker resembles the employee insofar as an
intermediary controls “some aspects of the methods and means of work.” Id. at 10.
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financial stability or expenses incurred from an on-the-job injury.198 Former
Deputy Secretary of Labor Seth Harris and Princeton economist Alan
Krueger identify the gig worker as the prototypical “independent worker,”
typically one who is staffed on a job via an intermediary. 199 Others view the
archetypal “dependent contractor” as one who is financially dependent on
one or a small selection of employers, the theory being that employer control
is linked with employee dependency.200
To create this third category, Harris and Krueger suggest omnibus
legislative reform.201 Among the rights accounted for in their legislative
overhaul are the “freedom to organize and collectively bargain,” the ability
to pool resources to purchase a range of services, tax withholding for Federal
Insurance Contributions Act payroll taxes, workers’ compensation
insurance, “wage and hour protections and unemployment insurance,” and
health insurance.202
Proponents of an independent worker classification argue that instead of
granting employee status for purposes of the employment statutes, various
mechanisms would ensure independent workers receive needed rights. For
example, via injunctions or other remedies, courts could ensure that antitrust
laws did not impede the independent worker from bargaining collectively.203
Additionally, disability insurance and health care would be made accessible
to independent workers via insurance pools. A safe-harbor provision would
be crafted to ensure that offering such workers these benefits would not
falsely indicate employee status.204
B. Challenges of a Third Category
While the proposal is a noble attempt to afford greater protections to gig
workers, it is doubtful that a tripartite system would provide needed certainty
for workers and employers. One challenge with creating a “third” category
is that it may create more problems than it solves. Already a difficult task to
ascertain who falls within the two extant categories, a third category is bound
only to compound the problem.205 Instead of clarifying the distinction
198. See id. at 6, 19 (“[Independent workers] are not true independent businesspeople . . . .
But their relationships with intermediaries are not so dependent, deep, extensive, or long
lasting that we should ask these intermediaries to assume responsibility for all aspects of
independent workers’ economic security.”).
199. See id. at 22.
200. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 12, at 30.
201. See HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 192, at 15.
202. Id. at 15–21.
203. See id. at 16–17.
204. See id. at 17.
205. For example, as in tribunals in jurisdictions with the third category, instead of deciding
disputes over independent contractor or employee status, courts would need to determine
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between the two existing categories of workers, the addition of the third test
would likely only shift the analysis.206 Additionally, in countries where a
third category has been implemented, such as in Canada, the addition has
effectively resulted in an expansion of the definition of employee.207 If
amending the definition of employee would achieve the same result, the
benefit of adding a third category is not clear.
For example, it is not apparent how a third category of worker, regardless
of nomenclature, differs in outcome from the employee defined by the
economic realities test. As discussed earlier, the economic realities test is
supposed to — in addition to examining traditional aspects of control —
account for the economic dependency of the worker on the hiring entity.208
Furthermore, a widespread legislative overhaul acknowledging a third
category and granting workers certain employment rights seems unlikely to
gain traction, given the lack of support in the Senate for the Protecting the
Right to Organize Act.209
Adding a third category to the mix also creates a practical challenge in
providing the collective benefits that Harris and Krueger envision for
independent workers, including collective bargaining, health and disability
insurance, and retirement benefits.210 For example, effective organizing for
the purpose of collective bargaining requires forming bargaining units that
have similar working conditions, methods of compensation, benefits,
supervision, and, importantly, contact with one another.211 Would dependent
workers and employees comprise the same bargaining unit? Intermediaries
purchasing group insurance plans would also face the task of sorting out
which workers had access to these plans. Theoretically, they would have to
sponsor multiple insurance plans — those for employees and dependent
workers.
These challenges suggest that maintaining the existing dichotomy is the
more workable option — Part III address a proposal of concentric circles to
accord workers the benefits and protections they deserve.

whether an employer had properly classified a worker as a dependent or independent
contractor. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 12, at 33.
206. See id. at 33.
207. See Cherry & Aloisi, supra note 193, at 655.
208. See supra Section I.B.ii.
209. See Jennifer G. Prozinski & Karel Mazanec, The PRO Act: Congress to Consider
Landmark
Changes
to
the
NLRA,
VENABLE
(Apr.
23,
2021),
https://www.venable.com/insights/publications/2021/04/the-pro-act-congress-to-considerlandmark [https://perma.cc/5ZMZ-254S].
210. See HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 192, at 17.
211. See Blue Man Vegas, LLC v. NLRB, 529 F.3d 417, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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III. MAINTAINING THE DICHOTOMY WITH REFORM: ANALYZING
WORKERS’ RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS THROUGH
THE CONCENTRIC CIRCLES LENS
Recognizing that gig workers do not fit neatly into either the employee or
the independent contractor model, Tanya Goldman and David Weil212 urge
policymakers to reconsider which party or parties should bear responsibility
for providing workplace protections and benefits.213 They envision a
theoretical framework wherein rights are accorded in “concentric circles,”
starting with an “Inner Circle” of protections afforded all workers, and
emanating outward to a “Middle Circle of rights, protections, and related
responsibilities.”214 This so-called middle circle “operates on a presumption
of employment,” where the employer is presumptively responsible for
providing rights unless the employer proves otherwise.215 The remaining
“Outer Circle” aims to clarify which party is responsible for providing and
funding “a range of portable benefits.”216
Goldman and Weil maintain that certain fundamental protections should
be afforded to all those who perform work regardless of legal employment
status.217 As such, the Inner Circle would guarantee all workers protection
against discrimination and retaliation, a safe and healthy workplace, fair
compensation, and the “right to engage in acts for mutual aid and
protection.”218
The Middle Circle is dependent on employment status. Still, the burden
is on the putative employer to disprove that the worker is an employee by
satisfying a revised version of the ABC factors.219 The Middle Circle
includes “the right to overtime under the FLSA, the right to organize and be
represented through collective bargaining under the NLRA, and safety net
protections, including access to workers’ compensation and unemployment
insurance.”220 In deciding how best to assure that the appropriate workers
are afforded these rights, Goldman and Weil explore the possibility of the
economic realities test but ultimately reject it in favor of a revised version of
the ABC test.221 Goldman and Weil envision an ABC test that incorporates
some of the factors from the economic realities test that, in their view, make

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See generally Goldman & Weil, supra note 27.
See id. at 70.
Id. at 88.
Id.
Id. at 89.
See id.
Id. at 89–90.
See id. at 101.
Id.
See id. at 103.
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it meaningful, particularly in the context of the modern “fissured
workplace.”222 They suggest that the ability to set prices and thereby incur
a profit or loss is particularly indicative of a legitimate independent
contractor.223
The Outer Circle comprises a set of benefits that employers are
incentivized but “not legally required to provide to legitimate independent
contractors.”224 For individuals classified as employees under the revamped
ABC test, employers would contribute to workers’ compensation and
unemployment insurance systems “based on hours worked rather than under
the assumption of a relatively fixed number of permanent employees.”225
Independent contractors, on the other hand, would pay into these “risk pools”
through their own or their customers’ contributions.226
IV. APPLICATION OF THE CONCENTRIC CIRCLES TO THE GIG
UNIVERSE AND PROPOSAL FOR MODIFICATION
This Part analyzes the application of the Concentric Circles approach to
the gig universe and agrees with the core aspects of the theory while also
expressing hesitation regarding the distribution of certain rights. Goldman
and Weil propose the Concentric Circles approach, in part, in response to the
corrosive effects of the fissured workplace,227 including the platform
business model, on workers’ rights.228 It is worth exploring in greater detail
how the layered rights and benefits they envision would work in conjunction
with this segment of the workforce. The “gig” workforce is uniquely
positioned insofar as workers perform short-term tasks to multiple clients;
yet, their ability to set prices, retain compensation for their work, and
establish a customer base is largely limited by the interposition of the third-

222. See id. at 111–12; see also infra note 227. See WEIL, supra note 3, at 15 for an
overview of the concept of a fissured workplace.
223. See Goldman & Weil, supra note 27, at 112–13. In addition, Goldman and Weil
propose that the following factors be examined in the course of their ABC-like analysis:
whether the worker sets quality standards, “set[s] key product or service standards; oversee[s]
the marketing and development of products; and make[s] decisions affecting the cost of
service provision or production.” Id. at 113.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 114.
226. Workers’ compensation and unemployment insurance benefits would reflect
contribution levels. The Outer Circle would also create mechanisms for “non-mandatory
benefits” retirement fund programs, outside of Social Security or “traditional employer-based
systems.” Id. at 115.
227. The fissured workplace refers to Weil’s foundational concept of the modern business
model, which shifts business activities that do not form the central output of the business to
outside organizations, and in pertinent part, focuses on reducing wages and minimizing
benefits. See WEIL, supra note 3, at 7–9, 15.
228. See Goldman & Weil, supra note 27, at 65.
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party intermediary. Therefore, there are factors that render implementation
of these rights a challenge.
The Inner Circle comprises antidiscrimination and retaliation protection,
the right to a safe and healthy workplace, the right to remuneration and a
minimum wage, and the right to engage in acts for mutual aid and
protection.229 Few would deny that all workers deserve such basic civil
rights. Moreover, congressional intent for these rights to apply broadly is
reflected in the statutory purpose of Title VII, the Occupation Safety and
Health Act (OSHA), the FLSA, and the NLRA.230 However, the
implications for the gig economy need to be fully fleshed out to determine if
the scheme is workable.
Affording gig workers the right against discrimination is feasible, though
enforcement mechanisms will need to be carefully considered. First, there
is precedent for widened application of federal antidiscrimination law —
Title VII’s application is not limited to current employees but extends to
applicants and former employees.231 Therefore, applying the law more
broadly is not a big leap. Intermediaries will need to budget for increased
legal fees, as they will need to take responsibility for enforcement of this
right, given that they are the parties more able to bear the financial burden of
pursuing legal action administratively or in court. With respect to holding
accountable involved parties, the online intermediary should be helpful in
that such apps necessarily retain users’ personal data.232 To ensure that
platform workers have a cause of action, Title VII’s definition of employee
should encompass workers for platform intermediaries.
The right to a safe and healthy workplace, as envisioned by OSHA, is
complicated for several reasons. For one, the nature of the jobs that gig
workers perform is inherently temporary. On any one day, a worker
providing cleaning or maintenance services on behalf of Handy233 could find

229. See id. at 89–90, 97. Mutual aid and protection includes any action that workers take
to better working conditions. See id. at 100. Weil and Goldman argue that all workers should
be able to engage in such acts without fear of retaliation. See id.
230. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151; see also id. § 202; EEOC v.
Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1210 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (applying Title VII to
third-party retaliation claim and describing the statute’s broad remedial purpose); About
OSHA, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.osha.gov/aboutosha [https://perma.cc/F5B4-D5XW]
(last visited Feb. 23, 2022).
231. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
232. See Prableen Bajpai, How Uber Uses Your Ride Data, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 20, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/030916/how-uber-uses-its-data-bank.asp
[https://perma.cc/MFD9-KK8P].
233. Handy is an app-based home cleaning, maintenance, and installation business. All
Services, HANDY, https://www.handy.com/services [https://perma.cc/2JGR-9A4H] (last
visited Feb. 23, 2022).
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themselves working in several “workplaces.”234 Would Handy be
responsible for ensuring that each customer’s home provided acceptable
working conditions?235 In the context of crowdwork, where workers perform
jobs remotely — and in many cases from home — OSHA could provide
standards that platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk and Upwork
would have to follow or else be subject to citation.236 Also, though this Note
agrees that all workers should be entitled to a safe and healthy workplace,
the question arises as to which employer would be subject to citations if a
worker receives jobs through several platforms. In many European
countries, for example, a worker acquires dependent worker status if she
derives a certain percentage of her income from the employer.237 If
responsibility is allocated based on the percentage of work, that could very
well cause problems of uncertainty for employers and workers and might be
particularly complex if an employee derived income from many different
sources at one time.238
While undoubtedly being compensated appropriately for work performed
is an essential right, even the right to the federal statutory minimum wage
runs into certain challenges in the context of the gig economy. As an initial
matter, workers should be assured prompt remuneration for any service
performed.239 However, guaranteeing a minimum wage requires further
consideration.240 As alluded to earlier, platform companies, such as Uber

234. See Masha Goncharova, Ride-Hailing Drivers Are Slaves to the Surge, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/nyregion/uber-lyft-juno-ride-hailing.
html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/4FQ9-9BKM] (suggesting that a worker
could simultaneously work for more than one app “workplace” at one time).
235. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration has addressed the issue of
traditional employees working from home but has not specifically addressed gig working
arrangements. See Letter from Richard E. Fairfax, Dir., Directorate of Compliance Programs,
Occupational Safety & Health Admin., to T. Trahan, CSC Credit Srvs. (Nov. 15, 1999),
https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/standardinterpretations/1999-11-15 [https://perma.cc/TMJ3
-J7YQ].
236. See Michael ‘Six’ Silberman et al., Crowd Work and the ‘On-Demand’ Economy,
EUR. TRADE UNION INST. (2017), https://www.etui.org/topics/health-safety-working-conditi
ons/hesamag/the-future-of-work-in-the-digital-era/crowd-work-and-the-on-demandeconomy [https://perma.cc/3F2M-YK55]. In addition to promulgating standards, OSHA can
also cite employers for providing a hazardous workplace under OSHA’s “General Duty”
clause. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). Perhaps in
the context of crowdwork, platforms could be required to subsidize workers’ home office
equipment to a certain extent.
237. See Felicia Rosioru, Legal Acknowledgement of the Category of Economically
Dependent Workers, 5 EUR. LAB. L.J. 279, 289–90 (2014).
238. See id. at 294 (discussing the issue of how to determine economic dependency on one
employer).
239. See Goldman & Weil, supra note 27, at 98.
240. As Goldman and Weil suggest, this could be assured via contract law remedies and
under different legal remedies associated with the form of work. See generally id.
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and Lyft, alter their prices in reaction to increased customer demand,
spurring certain drivers to choose to work during these more profitable
hours.241 Would all drivers be guaranteed the same base rate of pay,
regardless of when they worked? Uber could conceivably push back, saying
that a worker driving on a slow weekday night should not be guaranteed the
same rate of pay as a worker driving during rush hour. What is more, Uber
and other platforms have and likely would continue to argue that workers
should not be compensated for idle time, as in time spent between jobs.242
How and whether to account for non-working yet “active” time — time spent
engaging with the app but not performing a job — should be considered.
Goldman and Weil are not unique in their proposal that platform workers
should have the right to organize. Workers’ rights advocates and workers
themselves have urged policy reform in this area.243 The ability to bargain
collectively has the potential to catalyze major improvements in the working
conditions of platform workers. However, the collectivity and community
of shared interests that bargaining depends upon is less dependable in the
platform economy than in the traditional workplace, where workers naturally
have the opportunity to congregate.244 However, because of technology’s
ability to facilitate communication, organizing is certainly possible among
gig workers.
Considering that gig workers are spatially isolated, exercising the right to
organize and engaging in acts for mutual protection could provide a
challenge.245 The inherently varied nature of the work performed for these
apps and the fissured business models make it difficult to target collective
interests for reform. That is, Uber drivers do not have an identifiable
“supervisor” who sets terms and conditions of employment — these are

241. See id. at 21.
242. Platform companies are quick to point out that workers may spend time scanning more
than one “app” in search for customers, arguing that this time spent disengaged from the
platform may not be counted as working time. See Faiz Siddiqui, Uber, Other Gig Companies
Spend Nearly $200 Million to Knock Down an Employment Law They Don’t Like — And It
Might Work, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technolog
y/2020/10/09/prop22-uber-doordash/ [https://perma.cc/T2TH-BTRQ] (discussing Prop 22,
for which platform companies lobbied, and its exclusion of payment guarantees for idle time);
see also Natasha Singer & Mike Isaac, An App That Helps Drivers Earn the Most from Their
Trips, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/10/technology/a-dash
board-management-consultant.html [https://perma.cc/J2MX-2C7S].
243. See generally Figueroa, supra note 49.
244. See Michael David Maffie, The Role of Digital Communities in Organizing Gig
Workers, 59 INDUS. RELS. 123, 123 (2020).
245. It is not entirely clear whether Goldman and Weil support all workers’ right to
unionize or whether they envision protecting only other forms of concerted activity. See
Goldman & Weil, supra note 27, at 99–101. However, unionization and collective bargaining
would pose problems in the context of gig workers.
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instead controlled by corporate executives far removed from workers.246
Companies, in turn, would likely argue that algorithms determine much of
the working conditions. Selecting an appropriate bargaining unit when
workers do have varying conditions and potentially, interests, could pose a
challenge but would not be impossible.247
Instead of guaranteeing this right regardless of employment status, a
version of the economic realities test should control determinations of
whether a worker is an employee for purposes of the right to organize. As
discussed earlier, courts already employ the economic realities test for
purposes of FLSA.248 This revised test would more accurately capture the
economic dependency of the gig worker on the putative employer, omitting
factors such as investment in equipment and materials, and instead of looking
to the permanence of the working relationship, would ask what percentage
of a worker’s income she derived from her work for a given platform.249
Administrative guidance from the NLRB to this effect would ensure that gig
workers are not excluded by courts.
A version of the economic realities test reflecting the economic
dependency of the worker on a platform should also govern unemployment
insurance determinations. That is, all hiring entities should be required to
contribute to unemployment insurance funds on behalf of workers who are
economically dependent on their employer. A 50% threshold makes sense
because if a worker derives the majority of her income from a particular
entity, she is financially dependent on that employer.250 An economic
dependency analysis raises the question of over what period of time is the
person’s income analyzed.251 A period of one month might simplify
calculations and exclude workers who work for particular platforms on a
very temporary basis. A version of the economic realities test with a factor
analyzing economic dependency also makes sense in light of the purpose of
unemployment insurance laws — to pressure employers to share in the
financial burden of unemployment and to relieve state governments of some
of this responsibility.252

246. See, e.g., WEIL, supra note 3, at 14.
247. See generally Jin et al., supra note 17.
248. See supra Section I.B.ii.
249. This test would reflect rules in Spain and Germany, where if a worker derives 75%
and 50% of her income from an employer, economic dependency is established. See Rosioru,
supra note 237, at 294.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See, e.g., Daniel Nelson, The Origins of Unemployment Insurance in Wisconsin, 51
WIS. MAG. HIST. 109, 118 (1967–68).
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A. The ABC Test Alone Should Determine Accountability
for Workplace Injury
Under Goldman’s and Weil’s approach, workers’ compensation benefits
would be presumptively accorded if the worker satisfied the ABC test in
addition to certain factors of the economic realities test.253 This Note agrees
that the ABC test should be applied but does not view the added economic
realities factors as necessary in this context.
Placing sole responsibility for workplace injury on workers themselves is
unfair, particularly for those reliant on such work to earn a living.254
Inspection of both the third category and the Concentric Circles approaches
reveals that certain work-related injuries will not be accounted for, thereby
burdening economically precarious workers. Inevitably, workers who are
found not to be “dependent” per Harris and Krueger’s scheme will lack
coverage. Likewise, workers who do not satisfy the heightened ABC testeconomic realities hybrid entitling them to “middle circle” protections will
need to rely on the goodwill of employers who volunteer to contribute
towards workers’ compensation and unemployment insurance funds on
behalf of their workers.255
The ABC test has the greatest potential to provide coverage to workers
who are most deserving of workplace injury insurance and certainty for
employers, workers, and state agencies. It only makes sense that employers
should take responsibility for mitigating risks associated with the services
they provide, which the ABC test would ensure.256 However, if the ABC
test is to carry out this potential, it must be enacted in the form that the
Dynamex Court laid out.257 As discussed above, the political variations
spawned by implementation in differing legislative climates stand in the way

253. Goldman and Weil view the capacity to “set price, quality, and service levels” as
important indicators of employer status (in addition to the application of the ABC test). See
Goldman & Weil, supra note 27, at 112. In the context of gig workers working for locationbased platforms, this factor would militate towards employee status, given that platforms set
pricing and service standards.
254. See Monica Anderson et al., The State of Gig Work in 2021, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 8,
2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/12/08/the-state-of-gig-work-in-2021/
[https://perma.cc/YBG6-VWLA] (reporting that 23% of workers for technological platforms
rely on income generated through such platforms). As discussed in supra Section I.B.iii, the
ABC test is not currently the law for purposes of workers’ compensation in the overwhelming
majority of states. In other states, vague statutory definitions and the common law right to
control test govern. This leaves workers without certainty that they will be compensated for
debilitating on-the-job injuries.
255. See supra notes 214–26.
256. See supra Section I.B.iii. The B prong analyzes whether the worker is performing the
business’s core work. If the worker is carrying out such work and that work carries a risk, the
employer should bear some responsibility for mitigation.
257. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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of its success.258 Uniformity is particularly important across all states,
especially in the transportation industry, where workers may often traverse
jurisdictional lines with frequency.
B. Contribution to Collective Funds Should Be Mandatory
As part of the Outer Circle, Goldman and Weil suggest that employers
could voluntarily contribute to worker compensation, unemployment
insurance, and retirement funds based on hours worked.259 These
contributions would go towards supporting platform workers who are
classified as “true” independent contractors after the application of the ABCeconomic-realities test. While these pools would appropriately allow
employers to contribute funds to cover truly independent workers
performing jobs on behalf of platforms, more pressure is needed to ensure
the funds’ viability. As it is difficult to imagine employers — particularly
“fissured” corporations yearning to cut labor costs260 — voluntarily
providing for any extraneous benefit, employers should be required to
contribute a certain amount per profit towards these funds. This would
address potential difficulties in assessing how much to contribute on behalf
of each worker.261
Goldman’s and Weil’s Concentric Circles approach rightly accords basic
rights to all workers, regardless of legal status; that said, their
implementation in the context of the gig economy could provide challenges
that need to be carefully considered. Moving outward, this Part has agreed
that a test is necessary to determine which workers should be accorded the
next “tier” of rights, including unemployment insurance and workers’
compensation benefits. This Part has agreed that, for purposes of
unemployment insurance, a version of the economic realities test should
apply. For purposes of workers’ compensation, differing from Goldman’s
and Weil’s approach, this Note has argued that the ABC test is the best
solution.
CONCLUSION
The employment status of “gig” workers remains an open question in
many states and is subject to change at the federal level. In continuing efforts
to regulate the gig economy, courts, policymakers, and legislators should be
aware of the need for uniformity in this area so that workers with the same

258. See supra Section I.B.ii.
259. See Goldman & Weil, supra note 27, at 113–14.
260. See WEIL, supra note 3, at 126, 139–40.
261. Uber itself has suggested requiring gig companies to establish benefit funds,
indicating at least some stakeholders support the notion. See Khosrowshahi, supra note 19.
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job description are not employees for one purpose in one state and
independent contractors in another state. While changes are needed to ensure
workers receive appropriate rights, this Note has argued that maintaining the
existing employee-independent contractor dichotomy is workable.
As a matter of human rights, all who perform work, no matter their legal
status, should have confidence they will receive minimum compensation for
work performed and that they will have protection against discrimination.
Moreover, workers subject to injury on the job should be rest assured that
they can seek employer-sponsored insurance coverage — employers who
hire workers to perform work with inherent risks should generally be held
responsible for such injuries. Further, a version of the economic realities test
should be uniformly enacted to ensure unemployment insurance
contributions on behalf of those who are dependent on a single employer.
These reforms will more properly relieve states of the financial burden and
appropriately require the employer to bear some responsibility for supporting
workers who perform the core function of its business.

